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Summary findings
Kawai and Akiyama  examine the implications of the East  prominent again since late 1998. It is too early for
Asian currency  crisis for  exchange  rate  arrangements  in  conclusions,  but  the economies  seem likely  to maintain
thie region's emerging market economies. They focus on  more flexible exchange rate arrangements, at least
the roles of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the  officially.
euro in the emerging East Asian economies' exchange  At the same time, these economies presumably will
rate policies.  continue to prefer to maintain exchange rate stability
They claim that these economies are particularly  without fixed rate commitments. They are better off
susceptible to large exchange rate fluctuations because  choosing a balanced currency basket system in which the
they have been pursuing financial deregulation, opening  yen and the euro play a more important role than before.
markets,  and liberalizing  capital  accounts,  and because  The ASEAN countries  have a special  incentive  to avoid
they  face increased  risk of sudden  capital  flow  reversals,  harmful  fluctuations  in exchange  rates within  the region,
with attendant  instability  in their  financial  system and  which  could suddenly  alter their  international  price
foreign  exchange  market.  competitiveness  and  make  prospective  free  trade
Kawai and Akiyama  find  that  the dollar's  role as the  agreements  unsustainable.  So they  may stabilize  their
dominant  anchor  currency  in East Asia was reduced  exchange  rates against  similar currency  baskets,  to ensurc
during  the  recent  currency  crisis but  has become  intraregional  exchange  rate  stability.
This paper-a  product  of the Office of the Chief Economist,  East Asia and Pacific Region-is  part  of a larger effort  in the
region  to study  financial  market  development,  capital  flows, and  exchange  rate  arrangements  in East Asia. Copies  of the
paper are available  free from the World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact Athena  Azarcon,
room  MC9-142,  telephone  202-473-6049,  fax 202-477-0169,  email address  aazarcon@worldbank.org.  Policy Research
Working  Papers are also posted  on the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  The authors  may be contacted
at mkawai@)worldbank.org  or sakiyama@worldbank.org.  December  2000.  (65 pages)
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines implications of the East Asian currency crisis for the exchange rate
arrangements in  the  region's  emerging market  economies. In  particular, it  focuses on  the
international roles of the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro in the emerging East Asian
economies' exchange rate policies.
The East Asian currency crisis forced many economies in the region to shift away from
de facto US dollar-pegged  regimes to flexible exchange rate regimes. The US dollar had played a
dominant role as an international anchor (reference) currency in East Asia until the outbreak of
the currency crisis in July 1997. During the crisis, the anchor currency role of the US dollar was
substantially reduced, at least temporarily. As the currency crisis subsided in the second half of
1998, however, the East Asian economies largely returned, in practice, to arrangements akin to
the pre-crisis, dollar-based exchange rate stabilization regimes.  The question is whether or not
this  apparent reversion to  US  dollar-based regimes  is a  long-term trend. This  question is
important because it is often claimed that one of the causes of the East Asian currency crisis was
the de facto US dollar-pegged regimes of the pre-crisis period.
This paper argues that any emerging market economy, including those in East Asia, faces
a trade-off between the virtue of exchange rate stability and the need for flexibility, particularly
during a  time  of a  crisis, to  maintain international price competitiveness. The "two-corner
solution" approach of choosing either a free floating or a fully committed fixed rate regime (acommon currency, dollarization, or a currency board) does not appear to be realistic in many
emerging  market  economies,  including  East  Asia,  because  these  economies  have  strong
preferences towards exchange rate stability, though not necessarily rigidity. Given East Asia's
diversified trade and FDI relationships with the United States, Japan, and the European Union
and given the continued large exchange-rate volatility among the tripolar currencies, a reasonable
exchange rate policy for many East Asian economies would be to stabilize rates to a basket of
currencies consisting of the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro.  This paper proposes that
the East Asian economies should achieve real effective exchange rate stability by loosely tying
their rates to currency baskets during normnal  times, while allowing enough room for flexibility
during a crisis.
The  organization of  the  paper is  as  follows.  Section II  summarizes  the  nature  of
"reported"  and  "observed"  exchange  rate  arrangements for  developing  economies.  By
econometrically identifying  major currencies and their weights in a currency basket for almost all
developing countries, this section demonstrates that many authorities in these economies exhibit
a preference to stabilize their exchange rates vis-a-vis an international currency or a basket of
such currencies. Using further regression analyses, the observed weights in a currency basket are
explained by the country's share of trade with the relevant anchor countries or the currency areas
formed by such anchor countries. Section III briefly describes the process of the East Asian
currency crisis and contagion. It then empirically analyzes the importance of the US dollar, the
Japanese yen and the euro as an international  anchor currency for the exchange rate behavior of
12 East Asian economies before, during, and after the currency crisis using daily exchange rate
data. It examines the changing roles of the tri-polar currencies in the 1990s and the changing
2patterns of cross-country exchange rate co-movements.  Section IV presents the argument that the
de facto US dollar-pegged exchange rate regimes were indeed one of the factors behind the crisis
and develops a scope for future exchange rate arrangements  in emerging East Asia. It proposes a
"soft" currency basket system where the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the euro play more
balanced roles than in the pre-crisis  period. Section V summarizes the paper and offers an agenda
for future research.
11. EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS  OF THE LDC'S IN THE 1990S
This section reviews the exchange rate arrangements of almost all developing countries in
the world for the  1990s and obtains some stylized facts and general conclusions.' It focuses
particularly on the role played by the world's  major currencies, such as the US  dollar, the
Deutsche mark, and the Japanese yen, as international anchor currencies for other countries'
exchange rate stabilization.
1. "Reported"  Exchange Rate Arrangements
The Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF) regularly publishes exchange rate arrangements
reported by its member countries according to its own classification scheme. Table 1 presents the
overview of the developing world's exchange rate arrangements reported by LDC members, for
the period December 1980 through September 1998.2  Exchange rate arrangements are classified
broadly into three categories: (a) a fixed rate arrangement; (b) limited exchange rate flexibility;
and (c) a more flexible rate arrangement. 3
' See International  Monetary  Fund  [1997]  for  discussions  of exchange  rate  arrangements  in developing  countries.
2 This  table is compiled  from the IMF's International  Financial  Statistics  (various  issues)  by removing  industrialized
countries.
Beginning  January 1999,  the IMF introduced  a new classification  of categories  that include: exchange  rate
3First, the fixed rate arrangement includes a "peg to a single currency" and a "peg to a
basket of currencies." As target currencies for single-currency pegs, the IMF lists the US dollar,
the French franc, the Deutsche mark, the Australian dollar, the Indian rupee, the South African
rand, the Italian lira, and the Singapore dollar at end-September 1998.4 A peg to a basket of
currencies is further divided into a "peg to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR)" and a "peg to a
currency composite other than the SDR." While currency compositions of the SDR and their
weights are clearly defined by the IMF, those of other currency composites are specific to the
respective country and are in most cases not made publicly available. To find such information,
one must statistically analyze the observed exchange rate movements and estimate the basket
composition and currency weights.
Next, limited exchange rate flexibility refers to "flexibility limited in terms of a single
currency." Though not officially part of a "fixed rate arrangement," it is in reality a peg to the US
dollar.
Finally,  the  more  flexible rate  arrangement includes "other  managed  floating"  and
"independently  floating."  The  sub-category  "other  managed  floating"  suggests  that  the
authorities intervene frequently in the foreign exchange market to  influence the level and/or
volatility  of  the  exchange rate.  The  sub-category "independently  floating"  is  supposed to
represent a  textbook-style flexible exchange rate  regime. Both  of  these sub-categories may
arrangements  with  no  separate  legal  tender;  currency  board  arrangements;  other  conventional  fixed  peg
arrangements (including  de facto  peg  arrangements under  managed  floating);  pegged  exchange rates  within
horizontal bands; crawling pegs; exchange rates within crawling bands; managed floating with no preannounced
path for exchange rate; and independently floating. The new classification, however, is not strictly comparable to
earlier classifications. For the sake of data continuity, this paper uses classification reported until September 1998,
the last period for which comparable information is available.
4 In the past, the IMF used to list also the UK pound, the Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo (for their respective
former colonies), and the Russian ruble (for the newly independent, former Soviet republics soon after the collapse
4possibly contain heavily managed, or even defacto fixed, exchange  rate regimes.
While the number of IMF members in the developing world has increased over time
(from  118  in 1980  to 159 in 1998),  the number of developing  countries under fixed exchange rate
arrangements has decreased (from 90 to 63), and the number of countries under more flexible
exchange rate arrangements has increased (from 25 to 92). As far as "reported" exchange rate
arrangements are concerned, developing countries have shifted from  fixed to  more flexible
arrangements since 1980.
Though the number of developing countries on "more flexible rate arrangements"  reached
92 (58% of the total) in  September 1998, quite a few developing countries still attempt to
stabilize their exchange rates. Indeed, 67 developing countries (42% of the total) were on "fixed
exchange rate arrangements,"  including "limited exchange rate flexibility." It is also possible that
some countries under "more flexible arrangements"  have actually stabilized their exchange rates
vis-a-vis a certain currency or a basket of currencies.
Focusing on the fixed rate arrangements,  as of September 1998, the US dollar is the most
popular target currency (for 24 developing countries including 4 countries under "flexibility
limited in terms of a single currency"), followed by the French franc (for 15 countries), non-SDR
currency baskets (for 12 countries), the SDR (for 4 countries), and the Deutsche mark (for 3
countries). 5 It is noteworthy to observe that no country any longer pegs its exchange rate to the
UK pound sterling, particularly since 1986, or the Japanese yen throughout the period.
of  the  Soviet  Union)  as  target  anchors  for  single-currency  pegs.
Other  target  currencies  for  single-currency  pegs  include  the  South  African  rand  (for  3 countries),  the  Indian  rupee
(for  2 countries),  the  Australian  dollar,  the  Portuguese  escudo  and  the  Singapore  dollar  (for  I country  each).
52. "Observed"  Exchange Rate Arrangements:  Regression Analyses
The "reported" exchange rate arrangements provide useful information about the nature
of the arrangements as reported by individual developing countries. However, these reported
arrangements do not always describe the actual practice of exchange rate policies, nor do they
offer sufficient information as to which currency or basket of currencies is chosen as a target for
exchange rate stabilization. To understand what exchange rate arrangements  are actually in place,
one must statistically examine the behavior of observed exchange rates. 6
Regression analyses. One way to do this is to find, through regression analyses, which
major currency or currency basket is chosen as a target for a particular country's exchange rate
stabilization and how closely such a relationship can be observed. Extending the studies by
Frankel and Wei [1993, 1994, 1995],  Kawai and Akiyama [1998] conducted regression analyses
to identify specific currencies that comprise a basket used as a target for a particular country's
exchange rate stabilization and to find their weights in the basket. Exchange rate stabilization to
a single currency can be interpreted as a special case in which only one currency is identified
with a significant  and large positive weight, while other currencies' weights are negligible.
Specifically, Kawai and Akiyama [1998] estimated the following type  of regression
equation:
=  +  i1AeUSD  P2AeDMt  +  p3Ae",  +  p 4 AeFFt  +  P5Aeu  , +  (1)
where Ae',  is the monthly change in the log exchange rate of currency j in month t, oc  is a constant
term,  Pk  (k  =  1, 2,...)  is  the  coefficient  on  the  monthly  change  in  the  log  exchange  rate  of
currency k, and u, is the residual  term.  The estimated  standard error of residuals  is interpreted  as
6A  more  detailed  study  would  require  analysis  of changes  in foreign  exchange  reserves.
6a measure of exchange rate volatility. Though the G-5 currencies (the US dollar, the Deutsche
mark, the Japanese yen, the French franc, and the UK pound) were mainly used as candidates for
potential targets  for exchange rate  stabilization, the SDR, ECU, and  other relevant minor,
regional currencies were also tried as potential targets, depending on a country's economic as
well as non-economic (i.e., colonial, historical, cultural, and geographical) relationships. Using
information from the "reported" exchange rate arrangements, the Australian dollar, the Indian
rupee, the New Zealand dollar, the Portuguese escudo, the Singapore dollar, the South African
rand, and the Spanish peseta were included in the list of potential target currencies for certain
countries. 7 Data used were monthly average exchange rates for the sample period of January
1990 through December 1996.5  Following Frankel and Wei [1994], all the exchange rates were
expressed in terms of a numeraire currency,  the Swiss franc. 9
The underlying hypothesis is that every country attempts to stabilize its exchange rate to
a basket of multiple currencies. The coefficients on the right-hand side exchange rates, pk,  are
interpreted as the weights in a currency basket assigned by the country's  authorities. A single
currency peg is a special case, where the coefficient on the target currency for exchange rate
pegging should be unity, the coefficients on other currencies should all be zero, and the value of
The Russian ruble was not tried as a potential nominal anchor currency due to the lack of a sufficient number of
exchange rate data for the former Soviet republic countries.
8 The monthly average series of the exchange rates of G-5 currencies, a few regional currencies, SDR and ECU vis-
A-vis  the US dollar were obtained from the IFS data base (line code rf). Exchange rate data for Taiwan Province of
China (POC) were obtained from the Central Bank of China, Taiwan District, Financial Statistics, various issues. To
obtain  meaningful regression results, data observations with values  of  log  first  differences greater than  0.1
(approximately a  10.5  percent  change in both  directions) were  removed. This procedure  was taken because
countries often devalue their  currencies to accommodate persistent differences in inflation rates vis-&-vis  their
reference-currency country. Without eliminating  the effects of such discrete currency devaluations (or revaluations),
the regression results could be too unstable to conclude the presence or absence of target/reference  currency.
9  In other papers, Frankel and Wei [1993, 1995] use the SDR as a numeraire currency, but Kawai and Akiyama
[1998] did not  follow this  procedure because the  SDR was regarded as a  potential candidate for a  reference
currency.
7the standard error of regression residuals should be zero. If one country's currency is not pegged
rigidly, but is only loosely stabilized to another currency, the estimated coefficient for this target
currency should be statistically significant  and close to unity. Also, the standard error of residuals
should take a sufficiently small value. If a currency is pegged or stabilized to a basket of multiple
currencies, several coefficients should be statistically significant and should approximately add
to  unity. On the other hand, if a currency is on  a purely flexible exchange rate regime, no
coefficient should be statistically significant, and the estimated standard error of the regression
residuals should be large." 0
"Observed" exchange rate arrangements. Estimation results are summarized in Table
2.  '  The table classifies developing economies into three broad categories according to their
"observed" exchange rate arrangements,  that is, pegged, intermediate, and flexible, depending on
the size of exchange rate volatility as measured by the estimated standard error of regression.
Countries are classified to be under the "pegged" arrangement when volatility is less than 0.005,
"intermediate" when volatility  is  between 0.005 and  0.015,  and  "flexible"  when  volatility
exceeds 0.015; where the value 0.01 is approximately a  1 percent change in monthly exchange
rates. The size of  exchange rate  volatility is  shown next to  each country's  name. In  each
category, the table further classifies countries into three groups, depending on what currency or
Interpretation of regression results, however, requires caution. The reason is that the exchange rate of a country
whose shocks are highly correlated with those of the anchor country and whose inflation objective is similar to that
of the anchor country authorities may appear to be stabilized vis-a-vis the anchor currency, even in the absence of
any conscious effort of exchange rate stabilization. Such examples for industrialized countries in the  1990s include
the Swiss franc vs. the Deutsche mark and the New Zealand dollar vs. the Australian dollar.
l  The results in the table are obtained after extensive trial and error using many different combinations of the G-5
currencies, the  SDR, the  ECU, and  relevant regional currencies as  explanatory variables in  each  currency's
regression. For each country (or economy), a regression equation with the highest explanatory power, measured by
the R2-adjusted  and with reasonable coefficient estimates was chosen and its results reported.
8currency basket is assigned a significant weight in the regression equation." 2 Countries in the
"USD" group are those for which the US dollar appears as the only significant currency in the
regression equation. Countries in the "other single currency" group are those for which any other
single currency appears as the only significant currency in the regression equation, with the name
of the currency shown in parenthesis. Countries in the "basket of currencies" group are those for
which multiple currencies appear as significant in the regression equation, with the names of
currencies shown in  parenthesis. The pound sign  "#"  is  attached to  a  currency's  name  in
parenthesis if its estimated coefficient exceeds 0.80 on an adjusted basis. When the sum of the
estimated coefficients on multiple currencies is greater than unity, adjustments are made by
proportionally re-scaling the estimated coefficients downward so as to make the sum of the
adjusted coefficients equal to one.
The table provides interesting information on "observed" exchange rate arrangements
adopted by  developing  countries. While  Table  1  indicates that  an  increasing number  of
developing  countries  have  shifted away  from  fixed  towards  more  flexible exchange  rate
arrangements, Table 2 reveals that almost all countries attempt to stabilize their exchange rates
against  one  currency  or  a  currency basket, though the  degree of  rate  stabilization varies
considerably across countries. Many countries regard the US dollar as the target currency even
though they do not formally peg their currencies to the US dollar. Indeed, some countries under
formal, flexible exchange rate arrangements do assign a large weight to the US dollar. Many
other countries are using currency baskets as their anchor without officially announcing it. In
addition to the French franc zone countries, there are other isolated cases where regionally
12  The statistical significance level is 5 percent.
9influential currencies such as the Australian dollar and the South African rand are used as target
currencies.
Exchange rate volatility and domestic price  inflation. Cross-country data reveal that
developing economies that allow large exchange rate volatilities are those with relatively high
inflation rates. This is depicted in Figure  1 where exchange rate volatility (measured by the
standard error of regression reported in Table 2) is plotted against the inflation rate (average of
the log differences of monthly CPI series during January 1990 - December 1996). Since both
exchange rate volatility and CPI data are needed to draw this figure, the number of developing
countries is limited to 124. These economies are grouped into 6 regions: Africa, East Asia, South
Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America.
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that developing countries with high inflation rates tend to
have high volatility of exchange rates. Many developing countries in Africa, Europe, and Latin
America exhibit high inflation rates as well as large exchange rate volatility, although there are
several exceptions. Developing countries in the Middle East tend to have both low inflation rates
and small exchange rate volatility. Inflation rates of the East Asian emerging market economies
are generally low, thus enabling them to achieve relatively stable exchange rates.
3. Explaining the Estimated Currency Weights
Trade with  the anchor country or the  anchor currency area. What determines the
estimated G-5 currency weights in each developing country's currency basket?  The hypothesis
tested here is that the estimated currency weights are explained either by (a) the country's share
of trade with the respective anchor country (direct-trade based share), or (b) the country's share
of trade with the currency area formned  by the respective anchor country (currency-area based
10share).  In addition, it is also postulated that non-economic  factors, such as geographical location
and former colonial relationship,  may explain the currency weights.
The size of the currency area formed by an anchor country is calculated by assuming that
a G-5 country constitutes its own currency area; by decomposing every non-G-5 country into G-5
currency areas, based on the country's estimated G-5 currency weights; and by aggregating over
all decomposed G-5 currency areas. For each developing country, the volume of trade with each
G-5 currency area is computed according to this principle, and using bilateral trade data (average
exports plus imports for the 1990-96  period) obtained from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics." 3
In explaining the estimated G-5 currency weights, we have used a set of dummy variables
that represent the country's geographical location and the past (or present) colonial status. First, 5
regional dummies are introduced: Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America.
South Asia is the remaining regional dummy that is excluded to avoid linear dependence in
regressor variables. Second, 3 colonial dummies are introduced:  the French colony, the UK
colony, and the former Soviet Union Republic dummy. Only when a country was a French or UK
colony in year 1950 or was part of the forner Soviet Union at the time of its breakup, is the
colonial dummy used.' 4
" For example, the estimated G-5 currency weights in the basket for the Thai baht are 0.82 for the US dollar (USD),
0.11 for the Japanese yen (JY), 0.05 for the Deutsche mark (DM), and 0.02 for the UK pound sterling (UKP). This
means that 82 percent of Thailand  belongs to the USD area, 11 percent to the JY area, 5 percent to the DM area, and
2 percent to the UKP area. Hence, any country that trades with Thailand is considered to trade with the USD, JY,
DM and UKP areas according to these proportions. A country's total volume of trade with each G-5 currency area
was obtained by summing up over all its trading partners' decomposed fractions of the G-5 currency area.  See
Kawai and Akiyama [1998] for a detailed explanation of this computation procedure. When there were non-G-5
currencies in a currency basket, the currency area formed by each non-G-5 currency was recursively decomposed
into G-5 currency areas based on the latter's regression estimates.
14 It turns out that there were many countries that had colonial ties with France or the UK in 1950, but none with the
US, Germany or Japan. The data source is an electronic text version of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
The World Factbook, 1998.
11Estimation  results. In the regression analysis, all possible combinations of the above-
mentioned 13 regressors are tried as the right-hand side variables and, after excluding non-
sensical combinations of regressors, the regression results that are considered to  be the best
according to explanatory power, as judged by W 2-adjusted,  are chosen. Table 3 summarizes these
results  using direct  trade-based and  currency area-based trade  shares for  a  sample of  146
developing economies. Generally speaking, use of currency-area based trade shares seems to
explain G-5 currency weights better than does the use of direct-trade based variables: the more a
developing economy trades with one of the G-5 currency areas (rather than the G-5 countries),
the larger the weight of this anchor currency in the economy's exchange rate stabilization policy.
One notable exception is the case of the DM weight, where use of direct-trade based shares
produces better results, although there is no  qualitative difference in the  estimation results.
Another exception is the case of the UKP weight where use of currency-area based trade shares
does not yield an expected positive coefficient.
For the USD weight equation, use of currency-area data produces reasonable results with
an expected positive coefficient on the USD area. While the coefficient on the French colony
dummy is  negative  as  expected, the  model  for  the  USD  weight may  not  be  completely
satisfactory because of the negative coefficients of East Asia regional dummies. For the DM
weight equation, the choice of  direct-trade based or  currency-area based trade  share is not
important: a country's  share of trade with Germany or with the DM  area has the expected
positive sign in explaining the DM weight in a currency basket. For the JY weight equation, the
results  are relatively weak: the coefficient on the JY  area or  Japan variable is statistically
insignificant, and explanatory power is the lowest among the 5 equations. Trading with the JY
12area or with Japan does not necessarily increase the relative weight of the yen in a country's
exchange  rate policy."
5 For the FF weight  equation,  the estimation  result  is satisfactory  because
the coefficient on the FF area or France variable is positive and statistically  significant, even after
the relevant dummies are included. Finally, for the UKP weight equation, the results are difficult
to interpret: the UKP weight is not adequately explained by the share of trade with the UKP area
or with the United Kingdom. Numerous specifications failed to produce meaningful results in
explaining the UKP weight.
4. Summary of Exchange Rate Arrangements
The results discussed above reveal that the "observed" exchange rate arrangements are
largely consistent  with  the  "reported"  exchange rate policies,  with  some  exceptions.  The
discussions in this  section provide several stylized facts and  general conclusions about the
individual developing countries' exchange rate arrangements.
First, many developing countries have shifted their formal exchange rate arrangements
from "fixed"  to  "more  flexible" rate regimes. However, countries often exhibit preferences
toward stable exchange rates vis-a-vis a single currency or a currency basket. Countries facing
large exchange rate fluctuations against major international currencies are those in economic
transition in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union or those subject to chronically high
inflation.
Second, the US dollar is the most favored target currency for exchange rate stabilization
in the developing world (see Kawai and Akiyama [1998] for numerical estimation of the size of
the  US  dollar  area). However, significant diversity exists  across regions in  exchange rate
15 Thus, the limited use of the Japanese yen as a reference/target currency for exchange  rate stabilization is reflected
13arrangements.  Africa includes rigid exchange-rate peggers as well as free exchange-rate floaters,
and  its major  anchor currencies are the French franc, the US  dollar, and  the SDR.  Asian
economies generally attempt to stabilize their exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar, the SDR
and a few regional currencies. The Japanese yen does not play a major role as an anchor currency
even in East Asia. Developing Europe has not experienced stable exchange rates in  general,
while the US dollar, major Western European currencies, or a basket of these serve as loose
anchor currencies." 6 The Middle East includes countries that successfully  stabilize exchange rates
vis-a-vis the US dollar and the SDR. It is one of the most stable regions in the world in terms of
exchange rate movements. The whole of Latin America is a de facto  US dollar area, and cven
countries not officially pegging exchange rates to the US dollar do assign significantly positive,
and close to unitary, weights to the dollar.
Third, a  developing country's  choice of reference/target currencies for exchange rate
stabilization depends largely on which currency areas the country tends to trade with (excepting
the UKP area), as well as on the country's geographical location and its past colonial ties. That
is, a country that trades heavily with a particular currency area tends to choose this particular
currency as an anchor for exchange rate stabilization. By implication, a country that trades with
several currency areas with more or less equal shares is expected to choose a well-balanced
currency basket as its target for exchange rate stabilization.
III.  THE EAST  ASIAN CURRENCY  CRISIS AND  EXCHANGE  RATE MOVEMENTS
1. Thai Baht Devaluation,  Crisis Contagion,  and Restoration  of Stability
in the weak sensitivity of currency use to trade shares.
6 However, Eastern European countries  willing to be EU members are expected to stabilize their currencies vis-a-
vis the euro if they have not done so already (Honohan and Lane [ 1  999]).
14The Thai baht came under serious attack in February 1997. To support the peg, the Bank
of Thailand intervened heavily and issued some US$23 billion in  forward foreign exchange
contracts at a time when foreign exchange reserves were hovering around US$25 billion. As
investor perceptions began  to  worsen, finance companies, whose loan  portfolios had  been
deteriorating in quality due to the bursting of real-estate and economic bubbles, came under
pressure, and the government continued to pump a large volume of liquidity to  support them.
This led to  further capital outflows and a decline in foreign exchange reserves. In mid-May,
Thailand announced capital controls, after facing selling pressure and massive intervention in the
forward markets.' 7 Finally, on  July  2,  1997, the  government yielded  to  market  forces  and
abandoned the currency basket peg in which the weight of the US dollar was considered to be
dominant. The crisis that was to drive the rest of East Asia, as well as global financial markets,
into turmoil had begun.
The Thai baht devaluation triggered withdrawal of capital from the ASEAN region and
several other economies in East Asia as financial panic progressively set in. Developments in
Thailand caused investors to look more critically at vulnerabilities they had previously ignored
elsewhere. In the process, they discovered new information-especially  about the problems of
the  financial  system  and  the  magnitude of  short-term external  debt-that  amplified  their
concerns. Market doubts were compounded by the lack of transparency in the financial and
corporate sectors, and hence, about the magnitude of non-performing loans in the banking sector.
Once investors lost confidence that foreign exchange reserves would cover short-term external
debt, both domestic and foreign investors scrambled to get out. The lack of a mechanism for
'7 This capital control was eliminated in early 1998.
15orderly workouts of private external debt undoubtedly contributed to the full-scale financial
panic that swept Thailand, Indonesia,  Korea, and Malaysia.
A quick review of its chronology illustrates the dynamics of the crisis, along with its
spillover effects. After Thailand devalued the baht, the Philippines allowed the peso to freely
float on July 11, and Malaysia abandoned the defense of the ringgit peg on July 14.18  When an
IMF package was signed with Thailand on August 14, Indonesia allowed the rupiah to float.
Under exchange market pressure, Taiwan Province of China (POC) floated the new Taiwan
dollar on October 17, letting the currency depreciate. When the Hong Kong dollar was tested in
late October, the Hong Kong Monetary  Authority  jacked up the interest rate in order to defend its
currency board, leading to a sharp fall in the Hang Seng index. This produced a shock wave felt
throughout the global financial markets, causing stock price declines in both Europe and on Wall
Street on October 27 and, then again, returning to East Asian markets.
Although an IMF rescue package for Indonesia was signed on November 4, 1997, it could
not stop the rupiah's  depreciation. Korea was forced to widen its exchange rate band in mid-
November and both stock prices and the won fell sharply. Following the signing of the IMF
financial package on December 4, Korea finally abandoned the band and moved to a floating
system in mid-December. The Korean crisis situation was contained by mid-January 1998, when
an agreement was reached between Korea and international  creditor banks to restructure Korean
banks' short-termn  external debt. Between February and May of 1998, the most significant events
took place in Indonesia, with riots, looting and the resignation of President Suharto. The rupiah
fluctuated wildly during these political episodes.
8 In response to the increasing volatility, in early September 1997,  the Malaysian authorities introduced restrictions
16When the Japanese yen came under pressure in June 1998, exchange market tensions
developed in East Asia. Downward pressure on the Thai baht, the Chinese renminbi (RMB) and
other regional currencies mounted. However, cuts in US interest rates eased this pressure and
restored foreign exchange market stability in the region.
The financial market turmoil intensified again when Russia decided to devalue the ruble
and  to  impose  a  forced  rescheduling of  government debt  on  August  17,  1998. Russia's
devaluation  and  unilateral  rescheduling  led  investors  to  reassess  emerging  market  risks,
generating strong spillover effects on international  financial markets. In response to this turmoil,
Malaysia decided to restore its US dollar peg policy by imposing selective capital controls and
prohibiting offshore ringgit trading on September 1, 1998. Its objectives were to isolate the
domestic financial market from the intemational financial turbulence and to  prevent capital
outflows and speculation against the Malaysian ringgit.' 9 In the fall of 1998, a US hedge fund,
Long-term Capital Management (LTCM), went  into serious difficulties and posed a  risk of
systemic crisis, but the problem was carefully managed and effectively contained by the US
authorities.
The series of events described above demonstrate  how the crisis spread from one country
to another, and how the crisis and contagion swamped the entire East Asian region. Contagion
produced simultaneous falls in exchange rates in the region (see Figure 2) reflecting massive and
simultaneous capital outflows. Within the space of the last six months of 1997, capital outflows
from the region erased the inflows of the first semester, and turned the net flow negative by
on short sales of equities and forward sales of the ringitt. Shortly thereafter, some of the restrictions were removed
in response to a negative market reaction.
"9 The quantity-based capital controls were later modified through the introduction of a graduated capital gains tax
in February 1999, and were virtually eliminated in September 1999. The exit tax and the continued closure of the
17US$20 billion for the East Asia-5 affected countries. Between 1996 and 1997, net capital flows
had reversed by more than US$100 billion for the ASEAN-4 (US$71 billion) and Korea (US$33
billion). Only after the Russian and LTCM's  crisis subsided in late  1998, did the East Asian
exchange rates begin to stabilize.
2. The Currency Crisis and the Roles of the US Dollar, the Yen and the Euro
Let us examine the anchor currency roles of the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro
during the East Asian currency crisis. To do so, we have decided to run the following simple
regression equation by using daily exchange rates:
Aet = a + piAeu  t+ 02Ae', +  p3e`°  + u,  (2)
where  Ae', is now the daily change in the log exchange rate of currency j on date t. Similar to
equation  (l)  discussed earlier in  the  previous section, this  regression  equation  attempts to
determine  how  daily  movements  in  each  country's  exchange  rate  are  explained  by  the
movements of three major international currencies of the world, i.e., the US dollar, the Japanese
yen, and the euro. 20 All  exchange rates are expressed vis-a-vis the Swiss franc. This simpler
specification,  rather  than  country-specific  regression  form, has been  chosen  because  of the need
to compare the roles of the tripolar currencies across economies in East Asia as well as over time
for  each  economy.  As  in  the  previous  monthly regression,  the  estimated  coefficients  are
interpreted as the weights assigned by the authorities to the corresponding currencies in their
exchange rate policies. 21 Similarly, the estimated standard error of residuals can be interpreted as
a measure of exchange rate volatility.
offshore ringgit market are the only effective form of control that remained after September 1999.
20  For the sample period prior to the  introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999, the  European Currency Unit
(ECU), the predecessor of the euro, is used for the euro rate.
21 Again, this  interpretation requires  caution because the  market, without conscious efforts  on the  part of  the
18Pre-crisis, mid-crisis, and post-crisis estimations. In order to examine possible shifts in
the "observed" role of the tri-polar currencies before and after the currency crisis, we have run
exchange-rate regressions (2) for twelve emerging East Asian economies, including the Asian
NIEs  (Hong Kong  SAR, Korea,  Singapore, and  Taiwan POC),  the  ASEAN-4 (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand),  the smaller ASEAN-3 (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam),
and China. In particular, to examine shifts in exchange rate arrangements,  we consider the period
before, during,  and after the Thai baht devaluation. Using daily  exchange rate data  up to
December 1999, we have chosen to divide the sample into the pre-crisis period of January 1996 -
June 1997, the mid-crisis period of July 1997 - December 1998. and the post-crisis period of
January 1999 - December 1999.
Regression results are summarized in Table 4. Results for earlier 18-month periods are
also reported, to  compare with later periods. The table confirms that in the pre-crisis period
(January  1990 - June  1997), the  estimated coefficients of the  US  dollar were  statistically
significant and close to unity for all the economies studied (except for the smaller Indochina
countries). This again supports the proposition  that many East Asian economies were on de facto
US dollar-pegged systems until the time of the crisis. Nonetheless, the estimated coefficients of
the Japanese yen were significant, for some sub-sample periods, in Thailand (a maximum value
of 0.18 during January 1996-June 1997), Singapore  (a maximum value of 0.10 during July 1994-
December 1995), Korea (0.08 during July 1994-December 1995), Taiwan POC (0.06 during July
1994-December 1995), Malaysia (0.06 during July  1994-December 1995), Hong Kong SAR
(0.01 during January 1996-June 1997), but were much smaller than the coefficients for the US
authorities, may have chosen the estimated coefficients.
19dollar. In this sense, the Japanese yen played some role as part of a currency basket in the pre-
crisis period. 22 The euro also played an important role in Vietnam and some role in Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand though it was relatively insignificant in other countries.
Not surprisingly, many affected economies experienced noticeable declines in US dollar
weights in the mid-crisis period (July 1997-December 1998). This was particularly pronounced
in Indonesia (where the US dollar weight declined to a statistically insignificant level of 0.51),
Thailand (0.61), and Singapore (0.64). As the US dollar weights declined, the weights of the
Japanese yen rose  in  a  significant way in  some countries, particularly in Indonesia (0.69),
Singapore  (0.34), Thailand (0.31), and Malaysia (0.30).23  The weights of the euro were relatively
unaffected except for Vietnam where its role was relatively prominent in the pre-crisis period.
The overall implication is that the importance of the Japanese yen in the exchange rate policies of
several ASEAN countries rose during the crisis, while the euro's importance did not. 24
The regression results for the post-crisis period (January-December 1999) indicate a
return to the pre-crisis pattern of exchange rate arrangements. That is, the coefficients on the US
dollar  have  become  greater  and  significant again,  and  the  R2-adjusted level  has  become
substantially larger than in the mid-crisis period. 25 The exception is Indonesia where the US
22 The observed  role of the Japanese  yen in a currency basket for some countries such as Singapore, however, may
reflect the fact that the authorities chose the SDR as a target for exchange rate management policy. The Japanese
yen is an important component currency of the SDR.
23 If the mid-crisis sample period is shortened to, say July 1997-August 1998, the decline in US dollar weights and
the rise in yen weights are much more pronounced.
24 Whether the greater importance of the yen in the mid-crisis period truly reflects a conscious policy on the part of
some ASEAN countries to target the yen remains debatable. This may simply reflect correlations between shocks
and news affecting ASEAN's foreign exchange markets and those affecting Japan's, thus creating the  observed
statistical  results.
2  The higher US dollar weights observed in the post-crisis regressions may indicate that the East Asian monetary
authorities have reverted to the pre-crisis pattern of US dollar-based  exchange rate stabilization  regimes despite their
stated objective of free floating (with the notable exception of Malaysia). Alternatively, the post-crisis pattern may
simply reflect either the decline in exchange rate volatility in the post-crisis period (January-December 1999), rather
20dollar coefficient is still lower than the pre-crisis level (though it has become larger in size and
statistically significant in comparison to the mid-crisis period). Interestingly, the weight of the
Japanese yen continues to be significant in Indonesia (0.31), Thailand (0.12), and the Philippines
(0.10), even though the yen was never important in pre-crisis Indonesia or the Philippines. 26
Rolling regressions. Using 18-month  period data for July 1997-December 1998 as a mid-
crisis sample may be problematic because exchange market developments were quite volatile,
erratic, and dynamic during the crisis. Regional contagion,  delayed currency attacks (Korea) and
large exchange rate depreciations at times of political uncertainty (Indonesia) may have altered
pattems of exchange rate movements over the course of events. Therefore, we next examine mid-
crisis exchange rate movements in more detail by dividing the sample into a series of 3-month
periods."
Figure 3 reports the results of such rolling regressions for the period January 1990 -
December 1999. The 10-year  period is divided into a series of 3-month sub-samples, by rolling
over the sample by one month each. More concretely,  a total of 118 regressions are run, using the
first sub-sample period as January-March 1990, the second as February-April 1990, and so on-
all up to the final sub-sample period of October-December  1999 (see the Appendix Table for a
summary of the regression results). 28 Estimated regression coefficients of the US dollar, the
Japanese yen, and the euro are plotted against time: a thick solid line for the dollar; a fine solid
than a  conscious policy shift to exchange  rate stabilization,  or the authorities' concem about too rapid an
appreciation  of the currency  when  growth  momentum  was about  to pick up. Whatever  the interpretation,  it appears
that  the authorities  continue  to regard  the US dollar  as the most relevant  reference  currency  for their exchange  rate
policies.
26 Again,  the observed  post-crisis  importance  of the yen may be the result of common  shocks  and news affecting
Indonesia  and  the Philippines  on the one  hand and  Japan  on the other.
27 Our  preliminary  experiment  indicated  that  one  month  (with  about  20 observations)  was  too short  to produce
statistically  significant  results  for coefficients  other  than  the USD.
2S No observations  have  been  removed  in  this regression  analysis.
21line for the yen; and a dotted line for the euro. 29
The figure clearly reveals that countries under a stable peg throughout the period, such as
Hong Kong SAR and China, have maintained US dollar weights at levels close to unity. The R 2-
adjusted is close to 1 and the estimated standard errors of regression are small and consistently
below 0.001, which is close to a 0.1 percent change in daily exchange  rates. 3"
In contrast, other affected economies exhibit different exchange rate behavior over time.
In these economies, particularly the affected East Asia-5, the weights of the US dollar were all
close to unity and significant in the pre-crisis period. But in the mid-crisis period, the dollar
weights began to fall and became insignificant  for 8 to 13 months depending on countries. As the
US dollar weights began to decline during the crisis, the weights of the Japanese yen and, to a
lesser extent, the euro began to rise and even became statistically significant in some countries.
Striking changes are observed in the R2-adjusted;  they were all high, with some close to unity, in
the pre-crisis period but became low in the mid-crisis  period.
Singapore and Taiwan POC were less affected by the East Asian currency turmoil as
judged from the high US dollar weights maintained throughout the entire sample period. In the
mid-crisis period, however, the US dollar weights declined more significantly for the Singapore
dollar than for the new Taiwan dollar. An interesting observation is that the weights of the
Japanese yen for these two currencies became significant in 1998 (Singapore) or in the last few
months of 1998 (Taiwan POC). Furthermore, declines in R2-adjusted  in the mid-crisis period for
these two  currencies were  much less pronounced than those  for the  East Asia-5  affected
29 Since all estimated coefficients are shown in the figures irrespective  of their statistical  significance, some plotted
lines show erratic behavior; the euro reveals this tendency. The US dollar plots also include some non-significant
coefficient  values in the mid-crisis period.
This volatility is not directly  comparable in size  to the volatility reported in Table 2 where monthly exchange rates
22currencies.
3. Co-movements  and Contagion
Figure 2 suggests the presence of strong co-movements  among the East Asian currencies,
particularly  among the currencies of  the  crisis-affected economies, even under  the newly
introduced flexible exchange rate arrangements. What is the source of such cross-currency co-
movements? Is it a result of a conscious attempt on the part of the monetary authorities to
stabilize their exchange rates vis-a-vis other regional currencies, or is it a result of simultaneous
shocks hitting the foreign exchange markets and spontaneous market reaction to adjust to the
shocks?
The first panel of Figure 4 depicts correlation coefficients between the exchange rate
movements (the log first differences in the rate) for a crisis-affected currency and those for the
rest of the currencies in the region. They are calculated for each 3-month period in a rolling
fashion. The pre-crisis correlation coefficients were large, often exceeding 0.9, because of their
defacto  US dollar-pegged  exchange rate arrangements.  The correlations  naturally declined in the
mid-crisis period due to a shift to more flexible exchange rate arrangements. It is interesting to
note that, towards the end of 1998, some of the correlations began to return to the pre-crisis
levels, with the exception of the Indonesian  rupiah whose correlations  with other exchange rates
have remained low.
What are the forces that determine patterns of correlation coefficients? To examine this,
exchange rate movements are divided into predicted and unpredicted components. Predicted
movements are the fitted values of regression equation (2), and unpredicted movements are the
were used.
23estimated residuals of regression. It is interesting to see which factor is more important in
determining the cross-country co-movements  of exchange  rates.
The second panel of  Figure 4  depicts correlation coefficients between the  predicted
exchange-rate movements of a crisis-affected currency and those of other regional currencies.
These cross-currency correlations of the predicted exchange-rate movements were all close to
unity before the crisis.  During the crisis, correlations  of the predicted movements suddenly fell,
with large fluctuations during the period. Towards the end of 1998, correlation coefficients for
some currencies began to return to their pre-crisis levels. This is a sign of the restoration of more
stable exchange rate arrangements  in East Asia.
The third panel of Figure 4 depicts correlation coefficients between the unpredicted
movements of exchange rate pairs. These correlation coefficients are distributed around zero
before the crisis: essentially, systematic cross-currency  correlations were absent in the pre-crisis
period as far as unpredicted movements of exchange rates are concerned. During the crisis, the
correlation coefficients tended to be distributed around some positive values, suggesting the
presence of systematic cross-currency  correlations due to some common or causal shocks to the
system. The implication is that the perceived co-movements  of exchange rates during the crisis,
implied by Figure 2 and observed in the first panel of Figure 4, may well be the result of
unexplained  common or causal shocks, such as contagion, to the system.
IV.  A PROPOSAL FOR EXCHANGE  RATE ARRANGEMENTS  IN EAST ASIA
1. The Role of the De-facto Dollar Peg as a Crisis Trigger
With  free mobility of  capital, exchange rate movements are  susceptible to  market
24psychology and herding behavior, particularly in emerging market economies. Once investors are
convinced that the exchange rate is out of a perceived "equilibrium" level, massive, one-way
speculation can take place.
As discussed in the previous sections, many affected East Asian economies had attempted
to maintain relatively stable exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar. For example, Thailand had
been on a basket peg system until July 1, 1997, which required the Bank of Thailand to stabilize
the baht with respect to a basket of foreign currencies where the weight of the US dollar was
dominant. Similarly, other countries de facto  stabilized their exchange rates against the US
dollar.
The East Asian currencies with a large weight on the US dollar in their currency baskets,
became overvalued on a real, effective basis due to both higher domestic inflation than in the
United States and the US dollar's appreciation since mid-1995 vis-a-vis the major industrialized
currencies, particularly the Japanese  yen and the Deutsche mark. The emergence  of real, effective
overvaluation of the currency was an important factor behind the mounting speculative pressure
that developed in the foreign exchange market in 1997. Hence, the defacto US dollar-peg system
was one of the underlying triggers of the currency crisis. We must discuss the "peg" part and the
"US dollar" part separately.
Pros and cons of a currency "peg" policy. The first issue is whether the affected East
Asian economies made a mistake by pursuing the de facto "peg" system, rather than a flexible
rate system, in the pre-crisis period. Exchange rate stability clearly benefited the East Asian
economies, by  ensuring nominal anchor and price stability, creating stable environments for
trade- and FDI-driven economic development and growth, and avoiding regional beggar-thy-
25neighbor policies of competitive depreciation. In fact, exchange rate stability was an important
factor behind the remarkable economic performance during the East Asian Miracle period of the
mid-  I 960s through the mid-  I 990s (McKinnon [2000]).
However, an argument can be made that adopting greater exchange rate flexibility in the
mid-1990s, for example in 1995 or the first half of 1996 in the case of Thailand, might have
reduced the  volume of capital  inflows because of the probable exchange rate  appreciation.
Exchange  rate  appreciation  would  have  raised  the  risk  of  undertaking  continued  foreign
borrowing, because of the increased probability of currency depreciation, thus limiting further
accumulation of short-term extemal debt. Instead, de-facto fixed exchange rate arrangements
provided a perception that  foreign currency-denominated inflows posed  little risks  for both
domestic borrowers and foreign lenders. With high nominal interest rates at home relative to
foreign countries,  large volumes of foreign capital continued to pour into Thailand (and other
economies). In addition, defending a pegged exchange rate at the time of severe speculative
attacks and massive capital outflows is a difficult and potentially counterproductive task. An
early adoption of exchange rate flexibility would have relieved such speculative pressure without
imposing large  costs  on the  economy. In  sum,  even if  countries may benefit  from  stable
exchange rates at nornal times, maintaining an overvalued exchange rate at a time of speculative
attack would be difficult and potentially costly.
Pros and cons of defacto  US dollar-based exchange rate stabilization. The next issue is
whether the affected East Asian economies made a mistake by de facto pegging the exchange
rates to the wrong currency, the US dollar. There is no doubt that the East Asian economies had
enjoyed large benefits, for a long time until the mid-1990s, by choosing the US dollar as an
26anchor for exchange rate stabilization.
First, the US dollar was used extensively as a trade invoicing currency for international
trade in East Asia and in other parts of the world. 31 For each East Asian economy, stabilizing the
value of its trade in terms of the US dollar was a reasonable policy given that its neighbors and
many other countries in the world were using the dollar for trade invoicing.
Second,  rapid economic development and  growth in  the Asian NIEs,  the  ASEAN
countries, and China in the fifteen years until the outbreak of the crisis had been stimulated by
their stabilization to the US dollar. In the face of rapid yen rate appreciation that began in the
mid-i 980s, the de facto  US dollar-pegged system allowed these economies to receive foreign
direct investment from Japan and to integrate themselves with the regional and global trading
system. As Japan had already been gradually losing its international price competitiveness in the
low- to  mid-tech manufacturing products, yen rate  appreciation accelerated this  process by
forcing Japanese firms to move their production sites to East Asia. From East Asian economies'
perspectives, their exchange rate depreciation vis-a-vis the Japanese yen helped transform these
economies into attractive production bases and platforms, for Japanese multinationals, to export
products to the US and European markets. This process promoted international division of labor
in the manufacturing sector within the region and helped these economies industrialize and grow,
at least until 1995 when the yen rate rapidly depreciated.
When the yen began to depreciate vis-a-vis the US dollar in the Spring of 1995, however,
the emerging East Asian economies started to  see  deterioration of  their international price
competitiveness. Growth driven by  Japanese FDI  inflows began to  lose  its momentum. In
31Commodities  and primary  products  exported  by many developing  countries  tend to be  priced  in the US  dollar  in
27addition, yen depreciation began to dampen real economic activity in relatively advanced East
Asian economies (such as Korea, Taiwan POC, and Malaysia) that compete against Japan in
third markets (such as the United States and Europe). If the Japanese yen were to continue to
experience the "ever  higher yen syndrome" (McKinnon and Ohno  [1997]), then continued
exchange rate stabilization vis-a-vis the US dollar would have been attractive to emerging East
Asia. However, once the yen/dollar exchange rate began to go up and down and became volatile,
US dollar-based exchange rate regimes began to produce wide fluctuations of economic activity,
severely limiting its benefits. The reason for the close association between yen/dollar exchange
rate movements and East Asian economies' real activity is that these economies not only trade
with Japan, but also compete with Japan in third markets in certain products.
Table 5 summarizes the emerging East Asian economies' relationship with the United
States, Japan, the European Union, and the region itself in trade (exports and imports), FDI
inflows, and total stocks of inward bank loans in the pre-crisis year of 1996.  The table shows that
for many East Asian economies, the United States is no longer the most dominant economic
partner and that the relative importance provided by Japan and the European Union is as large as,
and in some cases much larger than, that of the United States. Striking is the fact that the share
provided by emerging East Asia is the largest for exports, imports and FDI. Following emerging
East Asia, the United States is the most  dominant as an  export market, Japan is the most
dominant as an import and FDI source country, and the European Union is the largest bank
lender to East Asia.
The fact that the emerging East Asian economies have diverse linkages with the rest of
the global markets.
28the world in trade and FDI suggests that exchange rate stabilization  vis-a-vis the US dollar alone
is not the best choice. Indeed, when the US dollar began to appreciate in the Spring of 1995, this
system resulted in  a loss of international price competitiveness and an overvaluation of the
currencies on a real, effective  basis.
2. Viable Exchange Rate Arrangements  Reflecting Diverse  Economic Linkages
The recent currency crisis in East Asia created a common trend towards more flexible
exchange rates at least as a "formal" regime in the affected countries (except for Malaysia).
During the crisis, the role of the US dollar as an anchor currency clearly declined in the affected
East  Asia-5 (Korea  and the ASEAN-4). As the crisis  subsided, East Asia's  exchange rate
behavior began to revert to the pre-crisis pattern of assigning a considerable weight to the US
dollar. This trend implies that the role for the US dollar continues to be important in the post-
crisis period, despite increased flexibility in the exchange rates vis-a-vis the dollar. If these
economies are to stabilize their exchange rates vis-a-vis some international currency or a basket,
at least in normal times, the issue is what currency  or currency  basket should be targeted.
For many emerging market economies in East Asia, a return to a "formal" fixed exchange
rate regime is unlikely, except for Malaysia, at least in the medium run. These economies have
learned the hard lesson that  a pegged exchange rate regime can be  vulnerable to  currency
speculation unless they close the capital account vis-a-vis the rest of the world or choose to
institutionalize a more permanent fixed rate commitment such as a currency board system or
dollarization (or yenization). They are not  likely to  close the capital  account or  set up  a
permanent fixed rate institution; they are likely to  maintain "formal" flexible exchange rate
arrangements  under open capital accounts. On the other hand, these economies are reluctant to
29float freely (Calvo and  Reinhart's [2000] "fear of floating") and have a  greater tendency to
intervene in the foreign exchange market. The implication is that the East Asian economies are
likely to  manage exchange rates so  as to  ensure reasonable rate  stability. Essentially, the
immediate adoption of the "two-corner  solution" approach (Eichengreen  [1994] and Obstfeld and
Rogoff [1995]) would be unrealistic. 32
Under this  scenario, given a  well-balanced diversification of  East Asia's  economic
transactions, a reasonable choice of target for exchange rate stabilization  is a currency basket that
includes the US dollar, the yen and the euro in a more balanced way than in the pre-crisis
period. 33 Actual currency weights in the new basket will depend on: the relative importance of
the United States, Japan and the European Union as trade partners and FDI sources for each East
Asian economy; future expectations of trend movements of the yen/US dollar exchange rate; and
the perceived success of the newly introduced euro.
In general, monetary authorities cannot pursue simultaneously both nominal exchange
rate and inflation targets, when the capital account is open.  However, if inflation targeting is
defined as a policy of achieving a weighted average of inflation rates of the United States, Japan
and the European Union and  if nominal exchange rate targeting is  defined as  a  policy of
stabilizing the nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis a basket of the US dollar, the Japanese yen and
the euro, then these two policies are in fact one and the same, at least in the long run when
In the  longer run,  however, one  of  the  corner solutions, that is,  introducing a  common currency through
coordinated regional integration may be  feasible and even desirable from  optimum currency area criteria. For
example, Bayoumi and  Eichengreen [1994] found that Northeast Asia  (Japan, Korea, and  Taiwan POC) and
Southeast Asia (Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and perhaps Thailand), in addition to Northern
Europe (not  entire Western  Europe), were  respectively plausible  candidates for  monetary union.  Bayoumi,
Eichengreen and Mauro [2000] concluded that in terms of preparedness for monetary union, Asia in 1995 was not
much different from continental Europe in 1987. But the lack of political commitment and institutional capacity
would make such a move difficult in the short run.
3  As the earlier finding in Section 11-3  indicated,  an economy  that has diversified trade and FDI relationships with
30purchasing power parity (PPP) tends to hold.  Nominal exchange rate targeting has one added
advantage over inflation targeting cum free floating: By removing the problems associated with a
floating rate regime (short-run volatility and medium-run misalignment of exchange rates), a
policy of nominal exchange rate targeting (with some bands) can better ensure exchange rate
stability in a way consistent with inflation targeting (with some bands).  This is particularly the
case for East Asia where the economies are small and relatively open so that domestic price
inflation reflects international price movements.  In essence, a "soft" peg to a basket of the tri-
polar currencies can stabilize intra-regional exchange rates, while maintaining a targeted range of
inflation rates.
It is not easy, however, for any East Asian economy to move unilaterally away from the
current exchange rate arrangement in  which the US dollar has a  dominant weight to  a  new
arrangement in which the relative weight of the dollar is smaller and those of the yen and euro
larger. 34 Given other countries' arrangements, each economy may not have sufficient incentive to
unilaterally alter its own exchange rate policy; a large share of trade with US dollar areas can
increase the country's  US-dollar weight. When neighboring countries stabilize their exchange
rates primarily against the US  dollar, there may be no  good reason for any one  country to
unilaterally  alter  its  exchange  rate  policy. This  demonstrates  the  potential  importance  of
coordinated action on the part of the East Asian economies.
The rising degree of intra-regional trade and investment interdependence in East Asia
means that, economies in the region are expected to benefit from avoiding large fluctuations in
intra-regional exchange rates. This is particularly the case for the ASEAN members, which are
the major currency areas has strong potential for choosing a well-balanced currency basket.
31expected to complete the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) by the year 2003 through
lowering  tariffs on manufactured products below 5 percent. Essentially,  large swings in exchange
rates  among the ASEAN  countries would be  counterproductive because they  would alter
international price competitiveness suddenly and  make the prospective free trade agreement
unsustainable. One way  to maintain stable currencies with one  another is  for the  ASEAN
countries to adopt similar currency baskets consisting of the US dollar, the yen and the euro and
to loosely stabilize their exchange rates to such baskets. This does not require formal agreements
on common baskets or frequent, concerted  joint actions in the foreign exchange markets. Instead,
the countries have only to choose similar baskets. 35
To summarize, emerging East Asia is sufficiently integrated with Japan and Europe, as
well as with the United States, in the area of trade and FDI. The region would be better off by
adopting officially flexible arrangements,  while in norrmal  times actually stabilizing the rates vis-
a-vis a basket consisting of the tripolar currencies. The desired weight to be assigned to the US
dollar would be lower and those to the yen and the euro higher than the pre-crisis levels.
3. Impact of the Euro on East Asia's Exchange Rate Arrangements
Although the above discussion suggests that the weights of the euro in East Asia's future
exchange rate policy could be higher, the newly introduced single currency is unlikely to rise to
the status of a dominant key currency. The geographical distance between Europe and East Asia,
and the continued structural rigidity of the EU economy are other important reasons why the euro
34  Honohan and Lane [1999] emphasized the existence of strategic interdependence  in the choice of exchange rate
regimes for neighboring countries that compete for exports in third markets and for FDI inflows.
3  As the degree of  intra-regional integration becomes deeper, however, more concerted actions in the  area of
exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies may be called for. And the choice of a common currency basket, or even
adoption of a common currency, may become desirable. See Williamson [I  999a, b].
32may not serve as a dominant key currency in emerging East Asia. 36
The introduction of the euro will bring several benefits and costs to East Asia. In terms of
benefits, the emergence of the euro will give private traders and investors a wider menu of
dominant international currencies and financial instruments from which to  choose. This does
great service to everyone in the world, including East Asia. East Asian traders and investors will
be able to hedge exchange risks using a larger, more efficient, and more liquid money market in a
unified Europe. Investors will be able to diversify their portfolios across an increasing variety of
international financial instruments, particularly those offered in the broader, deeper, and more
liquid European capital market. 37
In terms of costs, the emergence of the euro is expected to increase currency substitution,
thus creating greater fluctuations in the exchange rates among the euro, the US dollar, and the
Japanese yen.  Given that East Asia trades with  the US,  Japan and the EU,  exchange rate
fluctuations among the  tripolar currencies could pose  a  large  strain on  many East  Asian
economies. Furthermore, a unified, larger Europe would begin to  exert greater financial and
macroeconomic influence on  the  rest  of  the  world, including  East Asia.  The  East  Asian
authorities will have to take into account shocks emanating from Europe, in addition to those
from the US and Japan. East Asia's deepening financial interdependence with the rest of the
3  Once East Asia resumes its export expansion based on sustained economic growth, Europe is expected to face
renewed trade competition from East Asian exporters. East Asia's targeting of its exchange rates to the euro would
reinforce this trend to levels that might be politically unsustainable. Under exchange rate stabilization vis-a-vis the
euro, the East Asian economies probably would have to realign exchange  rates frequently. This suggests that, while
its international role may rise in East Asia, the euro is not a realistic candidate for the region's  major reference
currency.
3  Another global impact is that the emergence of the euro might place considerable limits on the policy autonomy
of the United  States (Bergsten [1997]). The United States might be  forced to pursue macroeconomic policies
consistent with sustainable current accounts and  stable exchange rates. This would be  a  welcome consequence
because it would ensure stable purchasing power and increased attractiveness for the US dollar, the most dominant
international  currency in the world.
33world, including Europe, implies that they will face even greater risks of sudden capital flow
reversals, increased pressure on the exchange rates, and undesirable effects on its local financial
institutions,  as  illustrated  by  the  recent  currency  crisis.  This  would  require  prudent
macroeconomic policy management on the part of the East Asian authorities, as well as more
frequent consultation with the EU (as well as the US and Japan) on the latter's macroeconomic
policy.
As the exchange rates of the tripolar currencies are expected to remain volatile, the East
Asian economies have the incentive to increase the euro's weight (and the yen's weight) in their
exchange rate management.
4. Possibilities for an Increased Role of the Yen
As in the case of the euro, the Japanese yen is unlikely to be the sole anchor currency, due
to Japan's limited size as an export market for East Asia, the continued perception of an "ever
higher yen," and its still shallow money and capital markets. 38 Whether the weight of the yen in
East Asian exchange rate arrangements rises or  not depends on how soon and  strongly the
Japanese economy recovers from the long financial crisis of the 1990s, and how attractive an
international currency the yen becomes. There are reasons to believe that potential exists for a
greater international use of the yen.
First, Japan's  economic interdependence with emerging East Asia has deepened over
time. This process is expected to continue as the East Asian economies resume their sustained
growth path, and as they become more similar to Japan, both in terms of economic and industrial
structure and in terms of output and trade composition. In addition, Japan's trade structure has
" See Hamada and Horiuchi [19871,  Tavlas and Ozeki [1992], Garber [1996], and Kawai [1996] for explanations of
34changed since the mid-1980s, mainly due to its overseas FDI activity. With diversified trading
partners and increased intra-industry trade, Japan has been expanding imports of manufactured
products, particularly from East Asia. If this trend continues, and if Japan offers larger markets
for foreign products, the international use of the yen as a trade invoicing currency is likely to
rise. In fact, in manufacturing products, 48 percent of Japan's exports to, and 29 percent of its
imports from, East Asia are invoiced in yen. Though still low compared with those of the United
States and Germany, these shares are much higher than those for Japan's overall trade that is
denominated in yen. A rapid expansion of Japanese markets for foreign products has potential for
the yen's greater attractiveness.
Second, the expectations of trend appreciation of the Japanese yen may be reversed in the
process of financial sector consolidation, economic recovery, and rapid aging of the population,
which would render use of the yen attractive in the exchange rate policies of East Asia. The trend
appreciation of the yen gave strong incentive for the emerging East Asian economies to stabilize
their exchange rates to the US dollar, because they could gain international  price competitiveness
against Japan by doing so. Japan's current account surplus is expected to be smaller due to its
eventual economic recovery (greater absorption) in the short run and its population aging (lower
savings rates) in the medium term, which would restrain the expectations of an "ever higher
yen."
Third, the on-going deregulation and liberalization of the Japanese money and capital
markets is  expected to  make  some progress to  transform Tokyo into a  more user-friendly
international financial center. This process would be accelerated by the Tokyo financial "Big
the limited use of the Japanese yen as an international  currency, even in emerging East Asia.
35Bang" policy on the one hand and, on the other, by the Japanese government's response to the
introduction of the euro and the unification of money and capital markets in Europe. If it is
successful in reconstructing as a healthy financial system, the Tokyo market could grow into one
of the top three international financial centers in the world. This would promote the international
use of the yen. 3
Room exists for the yen to play a more prominent role as one of the international anchor
currencies in East Asia. At the same time, however, the role of the US dollar will continue to be
dominant because of the effects of inertia and history. To the extent that the yen's attractiveness
rises, it may come to share the anchor currency role with the US dollar, in the sense of receiving
greater weights assigned by the East Asian authorities in their currency basket policies. 40
V. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
This paper has found that the role of the US dollar as the dominant anchor currency in
East Asia was reduced during the recent currency crisis period, but its prominence has recently
been restored,  particularly  since  late-1998. Although  it  is  too  early  to  conclude  anything
definitely at this point, the crisis experience suggests that the East Asian economies are likely to
maintain more flexible exchange rate arrangements, at least officially. At the same time, these
economies would presumably continue to prefer to maintain exchange rate stability without fixed
rate commitments. A case can be made that they are likely to choose a balanced currency basket
system in which the yen and the euro play a more important role than before.
"' Another point to be considered is the fact that the yen is being widely used to denominate long-term debt in East
Asia; since the 1980s, the East Asian economies have shifted the currency composition of their external debt away
from the US dollar and towards the yen.
4  Hence, the yen's role in East Asia will not be as distinct as the one that was played by the Deutsche mark in the
European Monetary System. Even in Western Europe, the French franc and the ECU before the introduction of the
36Given the strong degree of intra-regional trade and investment interdependence, each
economy in East Asia has an incentive to avoid harmful large fluctuations in exchange rates
within the region. This is particularly the case for ASEAN countries: large swings in exchange
rates among the ASEAN members would be counterproductive  because they could suddenly alter
international  price competitiveness and make the prospective free trade agreement unsustainable.
This implies that the ASEAN countries might find it useful to choose similar currency baskets
and stabilize their exchange rates against these baskets, ensuring intra-regional exchange rate
stability.
From a global perspective, the avoidance of large exchange rate fluctuations among the
major currencies will continue to be an important  policy objective not only for Japan, the United
States, and Europe, but also for emerging market economies such as those in East Asia, which
benefit from global exchange rate stability among the tripolar currencies. These economies are
particularly susceptible because (a)  they have been pursuing financial deregulation, market
opening, and capital account liberalization, and (b) they are facing increased risks of sudden
capital flow reversals, as well as the consequent instability in their financial system and foreign
exchange market caused by these flows. A greater effort is required to develop a framework for
international monetary coordination, not  only to  maintain stable exchange rates  among the
tripolar currencies, but also to minimize the risk of currency and financial crises in emerging
economies.  In  choosing  exchange  rate  arrangements,  the  emerging  market  economies,
particularly  those  of  East  Asia,  should  focus  on  maintaining  stable  macroeconomic
environrnents,  minimizing currency risks, and promoting trade, investment and growth.
euro  shared  the anchor  currency  role of the Deutsche  mark  (see  Kawai  and  Akiyama  [1998]).
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41Table 1. Summary  of Reported  Exchange  Rate Arrangements  of IMF-member Developing Countries
1980-1998
1980  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Fixed  exchange  rate arrangement  90  89  81  75  82  71  70  65  65  65  63
Pegged  to the US  dollar  39  31  25  24  24  21  23  22  21  20  20
Pegged  to the French  franc  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  15  15
Pegged  to the UK  pound  sterling  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Pegged  tothedeutsche mark  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  3  3
Pegged  to the Russian  ruble  0  0  0  0  6  1  1  0  0  0  0
Pegged  to other  currency  3  4  5  3  5  6  7  6  7  8  9
Pegged  to SDR  15  11  6  6  5  4  4  3  2  3  4
Pegged  to other  currency  composite  18  28  30  27  27  24  20  18  19  16  12
Limited  exchange  rate  flexibility  a  5  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4
Flexibility  limited  vis-a-vis  a single  currency  a  5  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4
Cooperative  arrangements  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
More  flexible  exchange  rate arrangement  3+b+c  32  46  54  58  77  81  88  89  89  92
Adjusted  according  to a set of indicators  3  4  5  5  3  4  3  2  2  0  0
Other  managed  floating  b  17  21  25  22  28  30  42  43  44  55
Independently  floating  c  11  20  24  33  45  48  44  44  45  37
Unclassified  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Total  118  127  132  134  144  152  155  157  158  158  159
Notes: 1) There  are  several  IMF-member  and non-member  developing  economies  that are  not included  in this  table,  such as Hong  Kong  SAR,  Taiwan  Province
of China,  and  Cambodia  (1980  and 1992).
2) The  last date  of this sample  is September  1998.
3) The  sum of a, b, and  c in the table  in 1980  is 25.
Sources:  IMF,  Intemational  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues.
42Table 2. Summary  of Observed  Exchange  Rate  Arrangements  of Developing Countries, 1990-1996
(a) Pegged:  volatility  < 0.005
No.  Obs.  No.  Obs.  No.  Obs.
USD  Volatility  ENcif  1cI  Other  Single  Currency  Volatility  Enxllnci  Basket  ofCurrencies  Volatility  E=toflnci
Afghanistan,l  S of0  0.0000  0/84  Benin  (FF#)  00000  1/83  ThaJand  (USD#,  JY.  DM,  UKP)  00009  0/84
Antigua  & Barbuda  #  00000  0/84  Burkina  Faso  (FF#)  0 0000  1/83  F1i  (USD,  AD,  JY,  UKP,  NZD)  0 0027  0184
Anuba  #  0.0000  0/84  Cameron  (FF#)  00000  1/83  Czech  Republic  (DM,  USD)  0.0042  0/47
Bahamas,  The  0 0000  0/84  Central  African  Rep  (FF#)  a 0000  1/83  Jordan  (USD,  SDR)  0.0043  0184
eahrain  #  0.0000  0/84  Chad  (FF#)  0.0000  1/83  Tonga  (AD USC,  NZD)  0.0048  0184
Barbados#  0.0000  0/84  Comors (FF#)  0.0000  1/83  Singapore  (SDR,  USD)  00050  0/84
Belize  #  0.0000  0/84  Congo  (FF#)  0 0000  1/83
Djiboult  8  0.0000  0/84  Cote  dnlvoire  (FF8)  0 0000  1/83
Dommica  8  00000  0/84  Equatonal  Guinea  (FF#)  0 0000  1/83
Grenada  #  0 0000  0/84  Gabon  (FF#)  0.0°00  1/83
Iraq  #  0.0000  0/84  Mali  (FF#)  0.0000  1/83
Lbenria#  0.0000  0/84  Niger  (FF#)  0 0000  1/83
Micronesia,  Fed  Sts  #  0.0000  0/84  Senegal  (FF#)  0 0000  1/83
Netherlands  Antilles  #  0 0000  0/84  Togo  (FF#)  0 0000  1(83
Oman  #  0 0000  0184  Kiribab  (AD#)  0 0000  0(84
Panama  #  0.0000  0/84  Lesotho  (SAR#)  0 0000  0/84
Qatar#  0.0000  0/84  Namibia  (SAR#)  0.0000  0/84
St Vincent  &  Grenadines  8  0.0000  0/84  Swaziland  (SAR#)  0.0000  0/84
Saudi  Arabia  #  0.0000  0/84  Bhutan  (IR#)  0.0002  2/82
St. Kitts  and News  #  0.0000  0184  Bnunei  Danussalam  (SID#)  0 0033  0(30
St Lucia  #  0.0000  0(84  Estonia  (DM#)  00037  0(54
Synan  Arab  Republic  #  0 0000  0/84
United  Arab  Emirates  0 0000  0/84
Yemen,  Republic  of  #  0.0000  2/77
Hong  Kong  SAR#  0.0011  0/84
Indonesia  #  00027  0/84
Egypt#  0 0035  2/82
Bolvia  #  0 0036  0/83
Trinidad  & Tobago  #  0 0047  1/83  .
(b)  Intermediate:  0.005  <Volatility  ' 0.015
No.  Obs.  No.  Obs.  No.  Obs.
USD  Volatility  EOclincl  Basket  of  Currencies  Volatility  Excl/lncl
Bangladesh  #  0.0068  0(84  Croatia  (DM#)  0 0064  0/24  Mautinus  (ECU,  FF,  USD)  0.0058  0184
Lao  People's  Dem  #  0.0088  1/83  Vanuatu  (AD)  00122  0/84  Cypnus(ECU,USD,UKP)  00058  0/84
Moldova  #  0 0073  0131  Westem  Samoa  (AD)  0 0148  0/84  Korea  (USD#,  JY)  0.0062  0/84
Azerbaijan  #  00078  1/18  Macedonia  (DM#)  0 0148  0/38  Cape  Verde  (FF,  PE)  0 0088  1/83
China,  People's  Rep  #  0.0093  2/82  El Salvador  (USD#,  UKP)  0 00B8  2/82
Costa  Rica#  0.0107  0/84  Tunisia  (ECU#,  USD)  0.0070  0184
Sunname  #  0.0118  5(79  Kuwait  (USD.  JY)  0.0073  0/75
Paraguay#  0 0119  0/84  Seychelles  (USD,  JY,  UKP)  0.0075  0/84
Guinea  #  0 0124  0/83  Libya  (USD  FF,  JY,  UKP)  0.0079  1/83
Ethiopia  #  0 0125  1/83  Botswana  (SAR,  USD)  0.0085  2(82
Solomon  Islands  0.0127  0/84  Taiwan  POC  1USD.  FF,  JY)  0.0087  0/84
Israel  0.0127  0/84  Myanmar  (SDR#)  0.0089  0184
Pakistan  #  0 0128  0/84  Malta  (ECU#,  USD)  0.0086  0/84
India  #  0.0130  2/82  Slovak  Republic  FF#.  USD)  0.0103  0/47
Maldives  #  0.0134  0/84  Iran,  I R of (USD.  DM,  UKP)  0 0108  2/82
Sri Lanka  8  0.0140  0/84  Malaysia  (SID,  USD)  0.0108  0/84
Nicaragua  0.0143  18/68  Morocco  (FF,  DM,  USD)  0.0108  0/84
Colombia  (USD.  SDR)  0.0114  1/83
Argentina  (USD,  DM)  0.0124  B(78
Guyana  (USD DM)  0 0130  4/80
Hungary  (USD.  FF)  00133  1/83
South  Africa  (USD,  UKP)  0.0135  0/84
Mauritania  (USD,  UKP)  0 0139  1/83
Gambia,  The  (FF,  USD,  UKP)  0.0146  0/83
_Nepal (IR, USD)  0.0148  0/84
(c)  Flexible:  Volatilitv > 0.015
No.  Obs.  No.  Obs.  No.  Obs.
USC  Volatility  ExcIleol  Other  Single  Cunrency  Vola.lity Enollncl  Basket  of  Currencies  Volatility  Excinel
Poland  0.0152  3/81  Malawi  (UKP)  00166  7(74  Latvia  (USD,  JY)  0.0150  5/53
Somalia  0.01586  0/s  Slovenia  (DM#)  0 0202  1/60  Chile  (USD#,  JY)  0.0151  0/84
Domincan  Republic8  0.0158  3/81  Taykistan  (UKP#)  00346  21/18  Burundi  (SDR#)  0.0152  1(78
AIgena  0 0159  6(78  Papue  New  Guinea  (USD,  AD)  0 0168  1/83
MexicoC  0.0163  4/80  Zimbabwe  (USD,  UKP/  0.0187  3v81
Honduras  #  0.0165  4/80  Madagascar  (SDR#)  0.0191  3281
Uruguay  #  0.0158  0/84  Ghana  (USD.  FF)  0 0192  0v84
Philippines  #  0 0168  0/84  Kenya  (USD  UKP)  0.0204  5/79
Vietnam  #  0 0169  2/69  Guatemala  (USD#,  JY)  0.0220  2/82
Mongolia#  00175  6(71  Mozambique  (FF,  USD)  0.0254  7(77
Ecuador  #  0,0180  1/83  Sao  Tome  &  Prindipe  (SDR#)  00276  8(73
Venezuela  #  0.0180  678  __  Angole(ECU#)  0.0395  40/28
Turkey  0.0183  4/80
Lebanon  0 0203  16/68  Note:  1) Countries  are  classifed  into  three  categories  of  exchange  rate  arrangements  (pegged,  intermediate,  and
Rwanda  0 0203  8(70  flexible),  depending  on  the size  of exchange  rate  vo/obildy  as measured  by the  estimated  standard  eror
Peru  #  0.0214  10/68  of  regression.  Counties  are  classified  as pegged"  when  the voleaility  is loss  than  0  005,  "internediate"  when
Turkmenistan  #  0.0239  1823  the  volatilty  is between  0.005  and  0 015,  and  "esible" when  the  vsiahfty  is greater  than  0.015.  The  size
Sierra  Leone  #  0.0242  7(77  of  exchange  rate  volatility  is  shown  next  to each  country's  name  In each  category,  countries  am  farther
Armena  #  0 0244  21/35  classified  into  three  groups,  depending  on  what  cunrency  or basket  of curencies  is assigned  a significant
Guinea-Bissau  0.0249  6(78  weight  n the  regression  equation.  Countres  in  the  'USD"  group  are  those  for which  the US  dollar  appears
Tanzana#  0 0250  2/82  as the  only signifmant  curency  in  the regression  equation  Countriesm  the "other  single  cuency" group
Cambodia  #  0.0250  13/46  are  those  for  which  other  single  curency  appears  as  the only  signfi.ant  currency  in  the regression  equation,
Albania  0 0251  2/57  with  the  name  of the  currency  shown  in each parenthesis  Countries  in  the 'basket  of currencies"  gnoup
Dilthuama  #  0.0260  3v45  are  those  for which  multiple  currencies  appear  as signficant  in  the regression  equation,  with  the names  of
Russian  Federati-i#  00261  11/25  currencies  shown  in  each  parenthesis  The pound  n,gn""  is attached  to a currency  if its  estimated
Nigeria  #  0 0267  3789  coefficient  exceeds  0 80  on  an  adjusted  bas/s when  the sum  of the  estimated  coe/ffi.ents  on  multple
Ukraine  #  0.0274  16132  currencies  is geater  than  unity,  adjustment  is  made  by prupomonally  re-scaling  the estimated  coefficients
Kazakhstan  8  0.0281  7/30  downward  so as  to make  the sum  of  the adjosled  coefficients  equal  to one
Uganda  #  0.0283  2/82  2) Data  observabons  with  values  of log  first  differences  greater  than  0.1  have  been  excluded.  The  column,
Haiti  #  0 0284  5(79  excl/incl,  shows  the number  of  obsenvations  excluded  and  included  in  the regression  equation.
Bulgaria  #  0.0294  14/58  3) The  curency  names  are  abbreviated  as  USD  = US  dollar,  FF  P  French  franc,  SAR  = South  Afrtcan
Sudan  #  0.0285  9(71  rand,  SID  = Singapore  dollar,  DM  = Deutsche  mark,  AD = Australan  dollar,  JY  = Japanese  yen,  UKP  =
Romania  0 0303  13(71  UK  pound,  NZD  = New  Zealand  dollar,  SDR  = Special  drawng  rights,  ECU  = European  cunrency  uat
Jamalca  8  0 0318  3/81  4) Croaba  reters  to  the 1995.96  penod.  Only Belanus  (the  size  of  vola/iiy being  0.0336)  exhibited  no  significant
Zambia  8  0 0335  19565  cunrency  in  thb regression  equation However,  the number  of obseNations  for Belarus  was  only  eight
Brazil  #  0 0380  46/38
Zaire  #  0.0453  53/21  Data  Source:  Kawai  and  Akiyama  (1998),  Appendi.  Table.
43Table 3. Determinants  of G-5  Currency  Weights in Developing  Countries' Exchange  Rate  Arrangements
Direct-Trade  based  Regression  Results  Currency-Area  based  Regression  Results
Major Currency  Weight  Coefficient  Std. Error R2-adj.  Major  Currency  Weight  Coefficient  Std. Error R2-adj.
US dollar  (USD) Weight  0.451 US dollar  (USD)  Weight  0.515
Constant  1.001  0.080  Constant  0.029  0.084
US's  Trade  Share  -0.020  0.208  USD  Area's  Trade  Share  1.247 ^^  0.146
France's  Trade Share  -1.977  0.328
--  --  JY Area's  Trade  Share  1.072  **  0.364
Germany's  Trade Share  -0.682  0.671
Regional:  Africa  -0.271  0.079
Regional:  East  Asia  -0.322  0.082  Regional:  East  Asia  -0.344 **  0.091
Regional:  Europe  -0.393  ^^  0.129  ---  --
Regional:  Middle  East  0.114  0.083
--  ---  Colonial:  France  -0.267  0.076
Colonial:  Former  USSR  0.213  0.148  ---  ---  ---
Deutsche  mark (DM)  Weight  0.153 Deutsche  mark (DM)  Weight  0.129
Constant  -0.029  0.019  Constant  -0.034  0.024
Germany's  Trade Share  0.829  0.267  DM  Area's  Trade  Share  0.403  0.173
Regional:  Europe  0.068  0.040  Regional:  Europe  0.078  0.042
Japanese  yen (JY) Weight  0.025  Japanese  yen  (JY) Weight  0.046
Constant  -0.001  0.009  Constant  -0.229  0.144
Japan's Trade  Share  -0.047  0.070  JY Area's  Trade  Share  0.176  0.153
Germany's  Trade  Share  0.161  0.079  DM  Area's  Trade  Share  0.412  *  0.171
--  ---  UKP  Area's  Trade Share  0.369 '  0.176
---  ---  FF  Area's  Trade Share  0.230  0.149
USD  Area's  Trade  Share  0.212  0.147
--  --  Regional:  Africa  -0.016  0.015
Regional:  East  Asia  0.025  0.016  Regional:  East  Asia  0.021  0.016
--  Regional:  Europe  -0.035  0.023
Regional:  Middle  East  0.017  0.015
Colonial:  Former  USSR  0.025  0.017  Colonial:  Former  USSR  0.070  0.028
French  franc  (FF) Weight  0.536 French  franc  (FF)  Weight  0.572
Constant  0.053  0.048  Constant  -0.004  0.047
France's  Trade Share  1.270  0.356  FF  Area's  Trade  Share  1.092  0.189
Germany's  Trade  Share  -0.811  0.483
---  ---  --  UKP  Area's  Trade Share  -0.798 '  0.376
Japan's  Trade Share  -0.250  0.247  JY Area's  Trade  Share  -0.242  0.211
Regional:  Africa  0.113  0.053
Regional:  Europe  0.146  0.093
Colonial:  France  0.207  0.097  Colonial:  France  0.241  0.078
Colonial:  UK  -0.063  0.044  Colonial:  UK  0.052  0.048
Colonial:  Former  USSR  -0.161  0.107  ---
UK pound  sterling  (UKP)  Weight  0.090 UK  pound  sterling  (UKP)  Weight  0.159
Constant  -0.025  0.017  Constant  0.857  0.259
UK's  Trade  Share  0.442  0.155  UKP  Area's  Trade Share  -0.665  0.343
--  FF  Area's  Trade Share  -1.044  0.291
USD  Area's  Trade  Share  -0.943 ''  0.263
Japan's Trade  Share  0.106  0.103  JY Area's  Trade Share  -0.800  0.266
DM  Area's  Trade  Share  -0.664  0.306
Regional:  Africa  0.031  0.018  ---
--  ---  Regional:  Europe  -0.074  0.038
_-  Colonial:  France  0.052  0.037
- Colonial:  UK  0.023  0.023
Colonial:  Former  USSR  0.110  0.033  Colonial:  Former  USSR  0.076  0.051
Note: 1) Double  asterisks  ('*) and a single  asterisk  (*)  indicate  that the estimated  coefficients  are
statistically  significant  at the 11%  and 5%  levels,  respectively.
2) The number  of observations  is 146.
44Table 4.  Regression Results  of Exchange Rate Movements:
Pre-crisis, Mid-crisis,  and Post-crisis  Periods
Hong Kong Dollar
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No. obs.
90/01-91/06  -0.014  0.993 **  -0.001  0.007  0.9973  1.566  0.000425  389
91/07-92/12  -0.008  0.998 **  -0.011  0.006  0.9956  2.579  0.000597  394
93/01-94/06  -0.004  0.995 **  0.000  0.003  0.9975  2.147  0.000358  390
94/07-95112  0.002  0.997 **  0.000  0.002  0.9994  2.018  0.000204  391
96/01-97/06  0.004  0.997  **  0.009 **  -0.007  0.9977  2.598  0.000277  391
97/07-98/12  0.000  1.001 **  0.006  0.000  0.9938  2.773  0.000528  393
99/01-99/12  0.014*  0.999**  0.001  0.000  0.9998  2.402  0.000108  261
Korean  Won
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No. obs.
90/01-91/06  0.172  1.004 **  -0.013  -0.011  0.9336  1.968  0.002149  389
91/07-92/12  0.210  1.026  -0.016  -0.006  0.8098  2.005  0.004458  394
93/01-94/06  0.045  1.014 *  -0.021 *  -0.002  0.9720  2.255  0.001208  390
94/07-95/12  -0.127  0.983  **  0.081  **  -0.045  *  0.9329  2.008  0.002205  391
96/01-97/06  0.354 **  0.960  0.065 **  0.020  0.8583  1.804  0.002378  391
97/07-98/12  0.758  1.149  0.039  0.084  0.0921  1.607  0.024301  393
99/01-99/12  -0.203  0.922 *t  0.061  0.001  0.7152  1.585  0.004190  261
Singapore  Dollar
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No.  obs.
90/01-91/06  -0.212  0.739  **  0.065  **  0.199  **  0.9167  2.309  0.002188  389
91107-92/12  -0.140  0.758 **  0.077  0.185  0.9482  2.309  0.001857  394
93/01-94/06  -0.160  0.865  **  0.049  0.098  **  0.9199.  2.131  0.001960  390
94/07-95/12  -0.189  0.789  **  0.098  **  0.117  **  0.9383  2.052  0.001915  391
96/01-97/06  -0.019  0.798  0.096  **  0.144  **  0.9294  2.167  0.001503  391
97/07-98/12  0.381  0.635  **  0.342  **  0.190  *  0.4851  2.181  0.006911  393
99/01-99/12  0.035  0.874  0.087  0.119 **  0.8463  2.177  0.002927  261
New  Taiwan  Dollar
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No. obs.
90/01-91/06  0.040  0.840  **  -0.017  0.240  **  0.4605  2.849  0.008475  389
91/07-92/12  -0.154  0.967 **  0.033  -0.003  0.6336  2.913  0.006803  394
93/01-94/06  0.193  1.012 **  0.055  -0.019  0.6664  2.875  0.005199  390
94/07-95/12  0.023  0.948 **  0.060 *  0.028  0.8956  2.022  0.002807  391
96/01-97/06  0.024  0.946 ^*  0.036  -0.001  0.8264  2.734  0.002573  391
97/07-98/12  0.382  0.867  0.090  0.068  0.5698  1.702  0.005472  393
99/01-99/12  -0.106  0.957 **  0.023  0.045  0.9495  1.765  0.001578  261
Indonesian Rupiah
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No. obs.
90/01-91/06  0.227  0.962 **  0.029  0.030  0.9094  2.084  0.002555  389
91/07-92/12  0.145  **  0.997  **  -0.006  0.016  0.9903  2.292  0.000900  394
93/01-94/06  0.131 *  0.995  0.010  -0.002  0.9739  2.044  0.001161  390
94/07-95/12  0.153  0.994 **  -0.015  0.011  0.9710  2.004  0.001438  391
96/01-97/06  0.156 *  1.009 **  0.001  0.002  0.9372  2.165  0.001528  391
97/07-98/12  2.982  0.512  0.692 *  -0.067  0.0167  1.961  0.053151  393
99/01-99/12  -0.313  0.769 **  0.313 *  0.207  0.1501  1.773  0.018294  261
Malaysian  Ringgit
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No. obs.
90/01-91/06  0.072  0.892**  0.027  0.096**  0.9739  2.207  0.001279  389
91/07-92/12  -0.138  0.874 *  0.025  0.090 **  0.9487  2.006  0.001944  394
93/01-94/06  0.004  0.906 **  0.001  0.020  0.8170  1.507  0.003072  390
94107-95/12  -0.062  0.869  **  0.059  **  0.084  **  0.9532  1.970  0.001738  391
96/01-97/06  -0.049  0.885  0.034 *  0.086 **  0.9226  2.018  0.001611  391
97/07-98/12  1.032  0.883  **  0.300  **  -0.035  0.1862  1.742  0.014911  393
99/01-99/12  0.000  1.001 **  0.000  0.004  0.9984  2.658  0.000280  261
45Table  4. (Continued)
Philippines  Peso
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No.  obs.
90/01-91/06  0.571  1.054 t*  0.043  -0.048  0.6891  2.011  0.005762  389
91/07-92/12  -0.363  1.048 **  -0.110  0.101  0.6700  1.991  0.006458  394
93/01-94/06  0.309  0.973 *  -0.006  -0.026  0.6154  2.013  0.005375  390
94/07-95/12  -0.045  0.986  0.062  -0.059  0.7805  2.221  0.004306  391
96/01-97/06  0.020  1.004  -0.005  -0.002  0.9936  2.202  0.000469  391
97/07-98/12  0.998  0.876  0.285  -0.022  0.1924  1 716  0.014420  393
99/01-99/12  0.131  0.876 **  0.096 *  0.043  0.6997  1.998  0.004362  261
Thai Baht
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No. obs.
90/01-91/06  0.014  0.961 **  0.031  0.023  0.9543  2.034  0.001766  389
91/07-92/12  -0.017  0.957  0.019  0.043 **  0.9782  2.007  0.001334  394
93/01-94/06  -0.037  0.972 **  0.012  0.006  0.9778  2.040  0.001049  390
94/07-95/12  0.017  0.877  *t  0.069 **  0.049  0.9882  2.410  0.000848  391
96/01-97/06  -0.053  0.823  0.178 **  0.154  0.4746  1.978  0.006179  391
97/07-98/12  1.014  0.608  *  0.311 **  0.099  0.1046  1.877  0.017221  393
99/01-99/12  0.093  0.775 **  0.119 **  0.139  0.5348  2.197  0.005990  261
Chinese Renminbi
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No.  obs.
90/01-91/06  0.317  1.025 **  -0.036  0.007  0.7145  2.007  0.005179  389
91/07-92/12  0.211  1.037  -0.041  -0.032  0.8889  2.042  0.003212  394
93/01-94/06  1.037  0.969 **  0.082  0.064  0.1159  2.007  0.019926  390
94/07-95/12  -0.113  1.030 **  -0.001  -0.030  *t  0.9829  2.082  0.001116  391
96/01-97/06  0.000  1.018 **  -0.010  -0.012  0.9335  2.832  0.001569  391
97/07-98/12  -0.008  0.996 *  0.001  -0.002  0.9919  2.471  0.000597  393
99/01-99/12  0.000  0.995 **  0.004  0.011  0.9939  2.966  0.000541  261
Vietnamese  Don
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No. obs.
90/01-91/06  1.431  *  0.419  **  -0.243  *  0.653  **  0.1748  2.118  0.013246  389
91/07-92/12  0.751  0.561  -0.013  0.263  0.1121  2.083  0.016349  394
93/01-94/06  -0.027  0.351 **  -0.109  0.725 **  0.2816  1.959  0.008682  390
94/07-95/12  0.088  0.607 **  -0.048  0.403  0.6055  2.163  0.005797  391
96/01-97/06  0.070  0.699 **  -0.036  0.415 **  0.5700  2.190  0.004833  391
97/07-98/12  0.440  1.014 **  0.037  -0.024  0.6258  2.271  0.005244  393
99/01-99/12  0.036 *  0.998 **  0.000  -0.001  0.9994  2.403  0.000166  261
Cambodia Riel
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No. obs.
90/01-91/06  3.464  0.375  -0.433  0.172  -0.0025  2.007  0.045834  389
91/07-92/12  3.234  0.280  0.448  -0.179  0.0060  2.039  0.042950  394
93/01-94/06  1.591  0.158  0.290  0.523  0.0130  2.023  0.033773  390
94/07-95/12  -1.048  0.885 **  0.145  -0.302  0.0969  2.037  0.019219  391
96/01-97/06  0.402  1.142  '*  -0.150  -0.358  0.1189  2.083  0.013866  391
97/07-98/12  0.816  1.333  **  0.120  -0.807  **  0.1295  2.291  0.019151  393
99/01-99/12  -0.137  1.127  -0.117 **  -0.320 **  0.6119  2.506  0.005043  261
Laos  Kip
Period  Const  USD  JY  EURO  R2-adj  D.W.  Std-res  No. obs.
90/01-91/06  0.441  0.343 **  0.111  0.195  0.0912  2.144  0.013244  389
91/07-92/12  0.214  0.243 *  0.175  0.124  0.1187  2.167  0.009874  394
93/01-94/06  0.100  0.284 **  0.026  0.309 **  0.1366  2.063  0.008243  390
94/07-95/12  0.673  0.794 **  0.122  -0.183  0.1754  2.068  0.013119  391
96/01-97/06  -0.044  0.704 **  -0.023  0.112  0.4029  2.121  0.005386  391
97/07-98/12  3.794  0.757  -0.240  -0.168  0.0119  2.139  0.032036  393
99/01-99/12  1.891  1.687  -0.388  -1.447 *  0.0175  1.954  0.049340  261
Note:  Double asterisks (**) and a single asterisk (*) indicate that the estimated coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1  % and 5% levels, respectively.
46Table 5. Shares  of the United  States,  the European Union, Japan, and East Asia in the Total International  Transactions
of the Individual  East Asian Economies, 1996
(Percentage)
Exports  Imports
United  European  Japan  East  Total  United  European  Japan  East  Total
States  Union  Asia  States  Union  Asia
Singapore  18.4  13.0  8.2  46.8  100.0  16.4  14.5  18.2  37.9  100.0
Hong  Kong SAR  21.3  14.9  6.6  45.1  100.0  7.9  11.1  13.6  60.4  100.0
Taiwan  POC  26.8  13.6  12.9  45.0  100.0  18.2  15.3  25.7  23.0  100.0
Korea  16.7  10.8  12.3  35.9  100.0  22.1  14.1  20.9  15.9  100.0
Malaysia  18.2  13.7  13.4  43.2  100.0  15.6  14.5  24.7  32.6  100.0
Thailand  18.0  16.0  16.8  32.7  100.0  12.6  14.5  27.8  24.3  100.0
Philippines  33.9  15.9  17.9  25.3  100.0  19.7  9.4  21.8  28.3  100.0
Indonesia  16.4  16.6  28.5  29.7  100.0  10.2  22.2  23.2  29.4  100.0
China  17.7  13.1  20.4  35.0  100.0  11.7  14.3  21.0  34.0  100.0
Vietnam  4.5  24.3  26.4  24.1  100.0  5.0  13.0  9.2  57.1  100.0
East  Asia  19.8  13.7  13.5  40.0  100.0  14.3  14.0  20.3  35.1  100.0
Foreign  Direct Investment Inflows  Outstanding  Loans from BIS-Reporting  Banks (Year End)
United  European  Japan  East  Total  United  European  Japan  East  Total
States  Union  Asia  States  Union  Asia
Singapore  39.6  23.1  34.3  n.a.  100.0  3.0  54.3  31.1  n.a.  100.0
Hong  Kong  SAR  9.8  18.1  45.4  22.7  100.0  4.2  41.6  42.2  n.a.  100.0
Taiwan  POC  19.3  5.0  22.2  18.6  100.0  12.4  56.6  12.0  n.a.  100.0
Korea  27.4  27.9  7.9  29.9  100.0  9.4  33.8  24.3  n.a.  100.0
Malaysia  17.0  5.1  27.0  36.8  100.0  10.5  41.4  36.9  n.a.  100.0
Thailand  21.1  16.3  47.2  44.3  100.0  7.2  27.3  53.5  n.a.  100.0
Philippines  3.4  17.5  6.0  41.0  100.0  29.4  47.6  11.7  n.a.  100.0
Indonesia  2.1  16.8  25.6  30.2  100.0  9.5  37.8  39.7  n.a.  100.0
China  8.3  6.6  8.8  68.7  100.0  4.9  47.4  32.3  n.a,  100.0
Vietnam  8.1  16.8  17.3  35.3  100.0  12.0  62.7  16.3  n.a.  100.0
EastAsia  10.7  12.1  21.2  46.7  100.0  6.2  43.2  35.4  n.a.  100.0
Source: International  Monetary Fund, Direction  of Trade Yearbook 1997.
Japan  External  Trade Organization,  Jetro White Papers  on Foreign  Direct Investment (1998).
Bank for International  Settlement,  The Maturity,  Sectoral and Nationality  Distribution of International  Bank Lending,
First Half 1997  (Basle, Junuary 1998).
47Figure 1. Inflation  Rate  and Volatility  of Exchange  Rates  (OLS residuals)
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48Figure 2. The East Asian Economies'  Exchange Rate Movements
(a) ASEAN Countries' Exchange  Rate Indices,  Offshore Rates (January 1997  = 100)
110  Thai  baht
90  . _,_,_  _ 90  - - ~~~~Philippine  peso
70  _  _  =
50  - Malaysia ringgt-  -
30  ___  ___  -- '___________  -
:1  ,'  '@"  tk,.  ,^tIndonesia  rupiah
10
10C)  >.  C~  ~  C)  ,  c  o  ,  ,  ,  T  la  ,  I  CD  CD
(''  ->  °  O  CN  O  o~~~~~~c  a  o  l  o  3  ol  D  O  C  M  O.  C,  CZ>  CD  z  o
(b) The Asian NIEs' Exchange Rate Indices (January 1997  = 100)
,  00  Hong  Kong
,\,  ~~Singapore  Nwawn-.,; 
80  __  _ 
)tv  /  K~orean  60  __  f
40
--  C-  C--  C--O  CD.  r-  03  C  D  CO  a)  Ct  0C-0)  0)  O>  0D  cc  CZ  OO
- 0)  C)  C-  - C  C)  0  CD  CC0  Cz  C'
Source: Datastream.





-2  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
.3







1  - -USD
-1  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _-.  EUROj
New Taiwan  Dollar  ____________
3
-1  EURO
-2  _  _  _  _  _







- /~~~~~  -S
-1  ,'  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~EURO
-2
.3
50I-  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  :0  -
99/01-  90/01-  cr  90/0  I-  ol  00/01I-  90/01  - -90/01  - -.
00/05- ~~~~~~~~~  90/05-  90/05~~~~~~~~~~~~~-7  S  90/0505 
90/05-  90/05-  Ck.  90/05-  CD~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  900  90/05-  ~9/5
~~  00'09-  0  ~~  90/09-  90/00-  '  A
90/09-9009  - 0-/  a  90/09-  3  9/9-9/9-'
91I/01  - 91/01-  - 91/01-/  0  91001  t
91/05-  q1/OS-  91/05-  01/05  W  1/05-  91/o5-
91I/09  0100  1/09-  -9/oq  91/09-  91/09-  f  91/09
92/01-  092101-  92/01-  92/01-  92/01  92101-
i  02/05  - 92/05-  ~~~~~~~-1  192/05
92/05-  92/05-  92/05-  q/5-9/5
92/09-  92/09  -92/09-  92/09-  92/09-  I92/09  -
93/01-  - 93/01-  - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~93/01-  90/01-  -9/1  00
93/05-  ~~~~~~~~~~~93/05-  99/05-  I  93/05
93/05-  9.3/05-  93/05-  93105-  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~93/05-  93/05-
93/09-  93/09-  I  93/09-  90/09  93/09-  93/09  -
94/01  - 94/01  940  94/10  94/01-  99/01-
94/n-  ~~~~94/05-  94/05-  94/05-  - ,94/05-  -94/05-  c
94/09-  - I  94/00-  ~~~~~94/09-  94/09-  94/09-  94/00-
- os/Ol-  ~~~~~~~  ~  ~  ~  ~~95/0;  --  95'/01  - /l  95/01-  9/0-
95/95-  os/os  - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~95/05-  95/05-  I  I0505-- 
(J.')  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~9/09  - 95/09  - 95/09  00~0i-  - 90/0?-
97/01-  I  -9/1  96/01-  96/01-  97/Il-  - /07/
9b//0  000-1)706//5-0/05-  /0-
00/01-  - 90/01-  - -~~~96/9  C
0/01-  97/01-  -9  0/01-  - 90/1-
9//05-  97  00/O-  - 90/05-4/-  90/00-  907/05
98/00-  900-  009  -9/09-I-  99/09-  0/00  -
98/01-  99/01-  90/05-  99/01-  98/01-  90/01-
98/0S-  09/os  - 009/05  - 99/OS-  99/Os  99/O09-
09/09-  99/09-  99/09-  99/09  - 90/00-  99/09-
0  0  0  0:n-Figure  4. Correlation  Coefficients  of Exchange  Rate  Changes
(a) Korean  Won  versus  Other  Currencies
Actual  _
0.8SI
0.6  8  _  K  NTD
0.4  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~-IDR
0  _______  __  _  -MLRi
-0.2 -P_P___  __  _  ___  ___
-0.4  _  _  __  __  - - +THBj>
-0.6
c7D  CD  CD~  Cc  cm  cc  CD  Cc  cc-cc  CD  - CcD  CD  c-c  CDc  c  CD  Cc  c-c  Cc~  c-  CD  cc  - CD  CD  c
~m  cc cm  cc cm  c  cc cy cm  c  ccc)cc  cccc  cc  c cc  ccc  c  cc  c  cc  - cm  )  cm  1  ccm  Cm  c  mcc  c~ cc~  cD-  c)  cc~ cc cc
Predicted
0.8  S ID
0.6  - _  _  - u-NTD
0 .4  --  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  --  D
0.2  ID  -THB
0  MLRrF  o  Y  ~  -w  P  N  0
-0.2  PHP-_  __  _  _  _  __  _  _
-0.4  --  - - _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  -L-----7!7THB
-0.6
-C  )C  DC  Z  CD  CD - rOCDCD  O-~  CD  C.-  CI)  COCCD  CD  -CZDCDcc
ccc  cc  cm cm cc cc cm  )  cm  cm  cm~  cm  )  cmcm  cm  )  c  ~  cm  )  cm  )  cm  )  c  ~  cm  Cm  )  (c  cmc  cm  ~  cm  ~  cm  ~  cm  ~  C'  cm  T  cm  ~  cmc cm  cm~  cm c
Residual  ______  __________
0.8
0.6  sii  A  SL  £4w 




-0.6  4__  _  _  --  - -- ,-THBK
-0.8
Cc~  Cc  ccCD~  CD.  C- CD-  c-.  CD-.  fCD  CDr'-  - CD-  - --- c  cr.)  CD  (  c cc (C~  r----  C-D  F- r-D  CD  ccc)  c  Cm  cmcmc
-m cm cm cm cm cm cm cm cm cm cm cm.  cm cm cm cm cm cm cm  m_  cmn  cn cn cn cm  cm  m c  c  cm  )  0c  cc  cm cm cm cm cm cm1l
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(b) Singapore  Dollar versus Other Currencies
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(d) Indonesian Rupiah versus Other Currencies
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(e) Malaysian Ringgit  versus Other Currencies
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(c) Singapore Dollar  (d) New Taiwan Dollar
Perid  ICoosl  USD  JY  eURO  R2-edt  OW  OSd-es  No.  obs.  960d  Coost  UOO  JO  EURO  R2-adi 0.W0  S1d-ms  No.  obs
90,01-90'03  -0234  ~~~~~  ~~0  790  008B2  a  055  '  0141  267  019  64  90/01-90/3  0  430  1053  -0 139  0060s  009018  2  032  0 oo2a18  84
90,02-90/04  -0  059  0  799  0 093  '  18  924  2 119  0001140  60  9002-90104  -O0068  1  064  0  026  0 010  0.7396  28634  0 003085  83
900/0-00,0  -0  221  0 009  0  143  0159  000640  2  012  0  001192  90  90003-90/05  0  696  1  123  -0 003  -0 153  086170  2091i  0  094986  66
9o`o4-90106  -0  290  06952  0  139  0 190  29709  1  972  0 001123  65  90004-90l06  00059  0994  '  0  030  -9 wo0  0  5833  2.129  0  009240  99
90105-90107  -0 269  0 737  0139-  0 157  0 9948  2 416  0001414  00  90/0-90/0  07000  0999  2 122  0 096  0 4150  2 277  6 008886  66
50,0-008  -91  0797  0  0509  0 152  019494  2  254  0  001708  66  g0/00-90/08  0  231  0  696  0  005  0  297  0  4690  2783  0  007782  88
00,07-00/09  -4  443  09815  0  006  0 140  999834  2  279  0.002896  65  90/07-90/09  0  071  0  702  0  060  0  269  0,4827  2  788  000D8267  86
go00901  -02865  0  90  NO  0  009  0665  098752  2  400  0  003188  06  99090-90/10  -0  290  0099  - -0 243  0  091  9  3902  2  707  09009499  66
06109-90I1  -0 302  0  879  66022  0  071  09487  2  389  0  003180  89  90109-00711  -9 309  1 013  . -0 369  0  124  0  3388  28593  06010098  85
90,  110-90172  -0 196  0829  0 098  0 088  09006  2 211  0 002376  00  90/10-90/12  -0 016  06826  -9 337  9  9139  0 2299  2 709  6011327  88
90,1-91,1  0  329  0  717  0  026  0 282-  0  9093  2  281  0  002011  86  90/l1-91,01  0101  90672  -0 099  0  464  0  2620  2  727  0  010384  00
9012-91,02  0900  0 721  00D39  0 215  098953  1849  000D2102  64  90/12-91,0  -0 014  00545  0 280  0403  0 2430  2 928  0 010476  64
/1/0191/03  0 004  0 700  0 060  0 201  0080O3  1961  0 002229  64  9101-91/03  0389  0 645  0 395  8  003788  0 3302  39095  09010014  84
91/0291/04  -0 403  0 678  0030  0 207  0 9274  1941  906D2192  83  91102-91104  -0 141  0 440  0 200  0 469  0 4068  3 000  0 012087  83
01/03-91/05  -0 232  0 689  0 030  0 251  0 9339  2 218  0 002170  00  9g/03-91105  -0 190  0 790  0126  0 482  0 4867  2 901  00Q10788  86
91/04-511000  -0 478  - 09637  0 099  0 314  019423  2 333  0 001900  89  51704-61/06  -0 363  0 990  '  -0 072  0 538  088604  28857  0 009519  85
51/05-91/0  -0 244  0 727  0 058  0 200  0 9426  2 45/  0051916  66  91/05-91/07  0 071  0 699  0 371  - 0 482  0 7079  2 702  00906181  88
91 00-01/08  -0 397  0 690  0 102  0 190  095914  2 265  09D01447  69  91709-91709  -0 086  0 723  0 464  0 137  0 6140  2 944  0 090199  89
91/07-91/09  -0303  8  0  716  0 030  0  242  0  9535  2 186  0  061902  88  91707-91/09  -0 340  09862  0  257  0  002  006214  29D92  0 000881  68
91,08-901,0  -0 292  8  0  7195-  0030  0  265  0  9495  2 154  0  001060  88  51/06-91/10D  -200  0000~  0  093  -0 030  065033  3  022  0  008112  88
91/09.91/11/  -0 219  0  679  0  049  0419  0  9300  2  269  0001822  65  91/09-9611i  -0 61  5  1  294  -0  239  -0  533  0  4373  20609  90  07449  69
91110-91/72  -0143  0  694  0  081  0 410  6  9114  2  766  000D1878  86  91/10-91112  -06534  1  090  -0  142  -0  314  0  3701  2  745  0  007000  00
/1/11-02.01  -0290  0  717  - 0.069  0  292  0  9248  2  890  0  002240  69  91711-92101  -00076  1  040  0  032  -0 329  0  3931  2  816  00109030  866
9~1,12-52/02  -0  244  0  739  0 010  0 167  0  9362  2  961  09001990  05  91112-92102  -0449  0  870  9  199  0  175  0  4218  3017T  0.011125  09
02/1-_92,03  -0  003  0  705  0078  0  207  0  8990  32065  0002591  89  92101-92/03  -0  149  05925  01517  0  117  0  4306  3  028  0  011040  65
5232-92/04  0  000  0970  0  1627  09337  0  8074  2  120  0  002391  64  92/02-92/04  0  192  00968  -0140  0  570  0  5888  28649  9  006799  14
02/03-92005  -9  036  0  669  018  9B  239  098782  2  009  0  092390  65  92103-92/05  -0  092  0  010  -0  050  -0044  075088  2  414  0  003878  85
92/04-920/0  -0  149  0  789  0  094  0  107  '  0  9637  2  532  0  001629  865  92/04-92/06  -0  494  1D001  ,  -0  002  -0152  0  8215  2  317  0  003102  85
92,05-92i07  -0 225  09843  00795  0  006  8  0.9740  25996  0061231  90  92705-92707  -0 098  09498  0  060  -0 083  088898  2  728  0050930  00
20000  -0 116  00902  0  027  0  099  0  98287  2  738  0009099  88  92/6920  0095  0 930  0  056  0  006  0  7032  29878  09095239  88
020-20  0154  01&44  0 070  0098  09978  2 134  0  001120  86  92/0-2/9  0305  0  929  0  072  0.083  0  8042  2838  0D008390  88
92/~08-910  0  013  0918  0  093  0 014  0  9919  1.644  0  001461  65  92/09-92/10  0  205  0  900  -0  029  01043  096840  29872  66004194  65
92/09-92A91  0  116  0  767  0  118  '  0 164  0  9793  1  695  0  001709  65  92109-92111  0  339  1000  - -0  020  0  067  0  8282  2  788  0004141  86
92/10-02.12  0  166  0919  00D84  9  102  0  9705  19831  9001003  88  92110-93/12  0  103  1050  -0  105  0  049  08B100  2.799  0 00801  88
921930  0116  08B71  -0 008  0 107  0  9140  1  668  0  001930  85  92/6-93/01  0  193  1230  -0  219  0  044  5  8240  2  744  00D04800  85
212-93/02  0000  0 898  0015  0  062  009589  1  743  0  001701  64  92/12-92/02  004  14  -12  -17  0  7751  2  702  0  005295  14
93/01-93/0  -036  6978  -0 004  0  070  0  9471  1  900  0  001880  64  93701-93/03  0  361  11044-  -0 020  -0  190  086429  29806  0 008209  84
03/02-03/04  -0  260  00894  0  030  0070  0  9678  2  008  0006l307  65  93/02-93/04  0  160  10371  --  -01043  -0/056  005729  28659  0000378  80
93103-93105  -0  2708  0  901  0  026  0  0668  000694  2  271  0  001524  88  93/03-93105  0  291  0  8406  0  029  0  063  0  5121  2  762  00063689  66
9510493106  -00D22  09806  0  122  -0 092  0  9116  20599  00O02384  69  93/04-93/00  0  143  0 862  009q4  0  247  0  6207  2  922  0.006416  89
93/00-93,07  -0  030  0  799  0  097  0  073  0  8901  2  714  0  002309  65  93005-3/07  0058  0 900  0209  -D0002  058298  2828  DtDD66
32
89
03069/0  0  097  09842  0  074  0148  08914  2  642  0  002388  69  97000-93/0  09601  1  099  0  092  0  04/  086289  2  706  69006989  88
33079100  -0~~,  397  - 00  -0  0  034  8  0  035  000637  29682  00D01441  68  93107-93/03  0  325  1053  0  051  4  022  0  6219  3  768  0  090372  89
931/6-97/10  -0292  0  962  '  09  04  015  18  0033  6  93/8-3/10  -0/13  114  001  05562  12  0078  8
9310-711  -0  080  0009  0004  0076  089  1928  0  002469  69  513/09-93/11  -11  0  il  9/2  0  211  0  010  06S538  30882  0000'405  65
93M0971  0 096  0 790  0 017  025  08775  1785  0 002315  66  9310/6912  -0353  /  952  - 0 261A9  -0 129  957685  292  0006034  88
93/11-04;01  -0 093  075  07  30  0 9329  1984  0001814  09  90/1:1-4/01  -0 062  661  003  -12  62  26  6073  8
03/10-94107  -0140  ~~~0803  01 47  0184  0 9904  106  0002114  04  9312-470  -0075  1020  -0082  -0 067  0 8171  3  479  0 003113  64
94101-94103  -0 276  00067  0 005  8  0192  09605  100  0 002133  84  94/0194/0  0025  0503  -0 037  -0 027  0 8990  20504  0 002399  64
,  5.  94302-94/04  -0 296  0890  0 067  0 101  0 9256  /A992  0 001701  84  940-04/04  -0010  05089  -0 019  -0 013  0 9800  291  0099  8
9410-94,0  -0420  000  0 109'  0 126  0 9260  2 277  0 001600  66  04/0-4/05  0 308  1 009  -0 001  -0 038  90097  1 985  00D01777  08
0~4/04-9406  -0 3486  0 832  0 070  0138  09288  2 2916  0 001593  65  94/0-4/0  0303  0 972  0 029  09013  0 9114  2 086  96001780  89
04/05-04/07  -0 353  9  81'  0 030  0 175  0 9549  2305  00616419  69  91/05-  70  0 147  0 97  -006  6 034  098913  2 007  0 002442  69
94/694100  -0244  08  :411'  0020  0 123  0822  252  35  000095  88  94/0-94106  -0 441  9  965  -0 024  0 000  0 9351  2 078  000D 195  88
59 17-9410  040  0 8309  0 092  001D4  00073  1A87  0001293  8  94/076419  -0378  0 900  -0 039  0012  009066  2003  0091000  88
04/09-94,10  -0369  8  0928  0159  0070~~~  ~~  ~~~  0  0990  057  00149  66  409-94/1  -028  0 949  -0 00/  0026  6 9691  89  00193  88
940-41-  -03286  071  0289  9 163  099413  173D0  0094648  65  94/0  9-4/11  0010  0903  -99036  0900  0 9517  2 160  0001313  89
0500n-94/1  -03275  0 701  0 19  '  0196  05425  2 135  99801420  99  14/110-/2  0041  0 904  -0 037  0 100  0.9373  2 071  005D1496  635
9111950I  -0177  0909  -0 012  0 180  '  0 8936  2 242  0002147  88  94/11-90/1  0144  0 908  -0 044  0 092  9  0 9407  2 288  0091808  66
04/12-35621  -0039  098  -0144  0 133a8  098502  2275  0 002245  68  98/12-95/0  0 022  19033  -0 069  0 039  000821  2 318  9001180g  00
05/01-05/03  -0071  ~~~~~07184  0 039  0 003  09195  2246  0092559  65  9015/3  -0 204  09077  0049  8  0094  0 99098  90  9094  6
05/02-35/4  0300  2 74  '  0 000  0 0798  0 9527  2 397  0 002239  03  95/2950  -00061  1030  -.  103  0 049  009443  1 980  0 003067  63
95IC3-95/05  -0 389  0619  0 070  0 074  8  0 914  3190  0 002297  90  90139105  -0 2509  9  013  0097  0 9199  2047  0 004123  88
05/04-95,0  -0 147  00790  0032  0 19  085  25  0017  85  9/-900  03  099  0 217  0 024  0 8713  2 182  00004  65
06/00- 90/07  0022  0057  -0006  0 089  009700  1 746  0 001454  68  95/05-05/07  0 038  090,2  0 146  0 083  0.8913  2 273  000347  88
95/00-95/00  0~~~071  0011  0007I  0 10  09319  1.692  0 001 729  66  95/06-96/09  1 109  0 907  -0054  -0 136  0 7052  2 337  9 003478  88
9/7909  -0 234  9 722  0171,  0221  09170  199  903293  65  9507-05/09  0 817  6  1047  -001  -03623  8  8439  2 052  0 00080  65
05/0  975/10  -0 300  07619  08  -.  17  009  1987  0 002492  88  95/09-99110  0 414  1001  05012  -0 222  0 8790  18863  009D318  08  6
95700-951/1  -0 264  0687  2 177  9 230  098920  2 019  0 053265  605  50-91  -0129  1010  0040  -0009  0989  18678  0 009204  69
50/10-55112  -0173  0752  9~~~~~~~~0102  0124  0 902  1910  0 001629  09  9510-95/2  0164  00  036  -17  795  18947  09D02818  89
97/11-96/01  -0 097  0740  0160  0331  0069  2  229  0001881  96  95/11-06/01  0 172  0403  '  00/  0004  97575  1 099  0002536  88
90,12-90,02  -0 094  09617  0516  0 300  0 6192  1 951  09002197  69  95012-99/02  006  0 691  - 0010  01047  0857  27153  0 001 923  85
06/0-09/03  -0 201  000  068  '  293  07959  1999  0 002194  65  56/01-96103  -0059  099 3  09028  0 095  07915  3 492  0 092118  85
56/02-96/04  -0 201  00642  0 034  0242  098487  1738  0 001636  64  96/02-90/04  -015  0002l  000  0018  0  6001  21454  000240  64
00103-615  -0/0  0797  00061  0122  0 9410  2 001  000D0969  68  60/03-96/0  -0011  000  01795  0130  081  2 101  9 002421  88
996/04-96/00  0 001  06847  0 009  0074  0 9701  2 104  0060750  65  95614-98/00  30904  00630  0631  - 0 2/0  0 7919  2116  0 002292  89
90/3-9-6/07  07130  0140  . 0 00  0 099  0 9715  2106  0 060892  68  96070-96/07  0290  0055  0130  0 253  8  0 7539  2 522  a0902897  6
96/096080  0 010  0889g  0 040  00(65  009677  2 150  0 000995  65  960/0-96/06  -00895  08953  0 037  0 079  0 8869  2 702  00D018865  65
06/70/9  -0 044  00085  0 052  0 076  0005  6  2 282  001087  80  96/07-96/09  -0 019  0 938  0 022  00931  0  9a  118  2 846  0001829  88
96  00-96,10  -0 103  01657  08  013  953  2 038  0 001008  66  96/089-00/0  -0 013  0975  0 044  _-9003  098  2.888  09009524  86
96770-911  -115  0791  936B  12  0 9621  1937  001023  65  98/09-90/121  0 010  098  042  0 003  91  11  0048  8
90,10-96,12  -3120  9773  0138  0141  0 9700  125  0 000006  0  01-01  0010  0 992  0 050"  0042  0 9990  1 952  000D0400  00
90179.1  -0  74  0 826  0094  0 116  . 0 9790  1 893  0.00909  86  9611-705  -0  116  0 954  0 014  0 018  00006  1 912  0.9000729  88
5612-57/071,  0070  0839  0 048  0121  09478  2 316  0 001367  65  96/2-970  -0059  0904  -0 003  0 015  09709  1802  000088  89
90,1/1-9703  0346  01849  0 025  0130  8  009033  2 294  0001931  64  97/01-97/0  -0 010  0 968  -0010  0 02/  000006  2134  0 001084  84
97/02-97/04  0 091  0 704  0 0988  0 100  2 8778  2 314  000295  93  97/0297/08  0 120  0 990-  0007  -0004  0.9722  2 452  09009033  63
97l03-97,05  0 090  00873  0.119  05  96  171  011  9  970975  024  180  0 046  -0 184  087;83  2894  0 009113  65
/7/04-97/06  -0 066  09062  011  0 050  96012  2129  0001397  66  97/04-97/0  0 263  1007  00'55  -0 184  096723  2.684  0 005097  85
07/5-07/7  0 295  00850  '  0 094  0003  0882  1 600  009309  66  97/09-97/07  00721  1090  0 063  -0 146  0 6255  2591  0 005400  88
97106-97308  0 757  0 812  a0071  00714  000O14  7763  0 004104  65  97/00-97708  0 453  8  114  -0019  0 016  0 8043  0 878  0003141  65
97/007-07,09  0 986  9  091A2  0 054  0 053  0 5964  1 999  0 004430  88  97/07-97109  045449  1 034  -0035  -0021  09018  0 772  0 002078  08
97/09-07/10  1165  8  0770  ~~~~~  ~~0  070  0 239  8  0 5858  2 032  0 009168  66  900-01  20  00  00  07  070  66  00028  6
07/09-07/11  0 722  1005  0 039  0 140  0 5979  2 316  000D5978  065  97/09-97/11  11  8  0028  0 112  0 090  0 2907  1242  0.008181  85
07110-97/p2  1293  0 900  -.  126  0170  02520  29029  0 006627  69  97/110-97/12  1624  0 659  0 120  0 03  02100  1321  0 008924  00
97111-98'01  1221  0846  0369  - -0163  03904  2 088  0 008720  85  977119171  1315  0 845  0 090  0 042  0 3182  1489  0 009122  65
92712-96/0  0  342  0844  06502  0237  0 3861  2 171  0 009107  65  97/12-90/02  -062  0 800  0 100  0 011  084001  1 414  0 000900  65
B/6/2-98/03  -0 703  0 791  0396  -0217  0249  220  0031  9  60-50  02  09  298  00  095234  1255  9.005880  14
/00298/04  -1 592  0  0 610  D  021  -0 302  0 3711  2070  0 00840  04  05/02-95/04  -0 646  0779  0211  '  -003  046708  1 097  0 003844  64
94l03-99/5  0 074  0500  0 285  -0 073  0 3897  1 577  0 00622  85  99/03-98105  00737  9  682/  0697  0060  00858'  3538  09003183  05
06-04-39/06  0 471  0 170  06892  0 820  04939  2 215  0007165  85  9904980  0759  0 701  0a191  0414  02731  2747  090707  65
06/05-26/'0/  0 313  0  D13  762  0 6398  0 4799  2 193  0 007984  66  9609-96/07  0 400  0697  0 100  0 324  0 2929  2.716  0007882  88
/oe9/09907  0 605  0 233  0 735  0388  061984  2 345  2 067039  00  98/()-98/08  026/  /a04  0 10'  0309  0 4987  28957  9006882  866
9417-90/09  -0093  0 521  0 429  0441  0  055967  2 177  006730  0  0  50/00-98709  -0 072  0906  --  000  0002  09351  1846.  0001717  00
90~6-90,6/0  -0 139  0 769  0294  . 0 3331  00077  1 972  0 00888889  9587~08-90/70  -00644  098  07  08  069845  1484  0003000  05
76/09-09/111  -0 546  0659e  0 254  0 476  0 6283  1 633  0 000518  66  960-9/1  -90  913  0079  000  080  168  0002922  09
0910-9612  012  1  071~3  0 150  0175  0982718  1 7051  0063559  65  9510-9/2  -0652  8  0 465  '  0 107  0 124  0 9083  1 702  0.002717  86
941-990  0469  0820  0187  0304  0626  303  0003190  95  99/11-99/6  -00711  00056  -.  0050  -0 004  0981l4  2194  0 001244  8
961-9002  079  044  012  00  933  22  025  84  98/12-99/02  0206  90087  0022  0 161  0 9219  7.785  00032580  0
09/09103  0591  0880  0 136  0 157  8  0 9010  2 467  009D2865  84  09/01-99/03  0 320  0 902  0 025  0 0D78  0 859  01  81  D083680  64
9902-99104  /  07  0972  0313  019  0717  2 262  0003423  65  59/92-09/04  06  099  0 020  008  07588  1 7933  0002700  85
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07/03.7/09  0  023  101  Oil  -0 003  -0  009  08881i  2  466  0  000331  65  97103-87/00  -0 587  00871  0  287  -0 053  059830  1  937  0  005708  65
97/04-97/0/  0  007  1D004  0  002  0  003  0  99814  2  424  0  060308  69  97/04-978  -0  370  0  780  00420  0  412  0.2304  2  029  00C15178  65
97/5-97107  00892  0198  -0  28  00649  00D563  1 28  0  014258  08  97/00-57/0  1 945  -0 100  -0  040  1 6418  00D488  1  978  0 027020  66
97/7-971058  /  047  0  380  -Q0528  _  -19  -0 0310  1497  001800989  85  7/08-87/08  4  804  06807  0  021  0090o  0  0110  200  0027041  05
97/07-97/0  3067  6  0  207  0.308  -0  348  -0 0124  1 783  0  018857  66  97/07-87/09  0  704  9  0  54  -0_121  00D61  -0 0312  2000  0  029249  60
97/08-97/1o  1026  0009  0  483  -0  200  0  2062  2  041  001  5833  60  97/00-7/0  36402  8  1011  3162  -0 300  0  1324  2  279  0 019876  00
97/09-07/11  / 702  0005  8  0280  -0190  0118  1883  0  018314  00  9719-7/1  2  926  1060  -0 116  -0  273  005989  2104  0 01790  05
07/1O7-9712  2140  09860 8  0080S  0  018  0/0608  1358  0  019436  86  87/10-87/12  4  232  8  0  701  0 107  -0  013  00D624  2083  0  018082  66
97/11-96/3  3  219  / 016  8  0 392  -0  048  0 1153  1258  00D19889  65  97/11-9801D  3  789  0  490  070  6  0  404  0  0607  / 812  0  020796  69
97/217-00  20064  068748  0 953  -0  204  0 1875  1  268  0018928  80  97/12-98/02  1  330  08502  1  087  -0  257  0.1132  10648  0.02392  65
804/1-90/0  -0  409  1  109-  09878  -0 248  0  2993  1418  00108934  84  98/01  -88/03  -3 456  0  421  0  84068  -07/0  00D337  1673  0  024130  64
90/02-000  -1 087  1  345  0.  680  - -0 778  0  2804  2  083  0  013808  84  98/02-90/04  -5 727.  0  569  0  598  -0 772  090251  1  621  0  01943  64
06/0-9105"  -0707  1320  0  280  -0 170  030547  2  281  0013385  05  98/3-8/0  -1609  0044  0287  0333  -0  0084  1871  0  054450  65
90/04-90/0  16040  09585  0363  133528  0.1940  2  340  0  013816  85  88/04-98/00  0  749  05680  0  602  0306  0.3039  1 942  0  010008  55
90,05-90,77  0  390  0  475  0280  9  0  510  00828  2.313  0019  424  80  90/05-98/7  0  042  0  210  09630  0  142  0  2702  1.50  0  00938  66
90i06-00/i00  1 501  0  516  6  0  346  0708  0  2601  2227  0  010880  06  98/08-98/0  0394  0  308  0  66  0209  0424  1 624  0  00077  80
96/07-96/00  0  402  100o-  0  225  0001,  0  5322  1605  0067322  66  98/07-98/00  -10068  0  530  0  260  00638  - 04079  1946  0  0074/2  6/
90l00-90//0  -2 343  1022  0 107  008  09a  208  1  604  00G07838  85  8108-98110  -1  237  0686  01~74  0  251  00210  18314  00.0744  95
90'09-90/11  -1430  1070  0149  _  0  030  086214  2089  0  007045  85  08/0889111  -/860  00819  012  0  374  06105  1001  0  080889  65
00/10-35/12  -1 405*  I 069  0  122  9  -0  226  09481  0  079  0  080633  08  98/10-05/12  -0  706  0956  -.  0092  0  024  0  7100  18934  0  005527  08
95/11-99/0/  -09530  0930  . 0  338  -0  378  08443  2331l  0D066821  85  88/91-99/901  -0  090  00895  D  33406  0  297  0  5032  29544  0  007933  05
98112-99/02  -O000  0 703  . 0  294  -0002  08947  1  874  0  0061  36  94  88/12-98/02  09523  0  703  0  204  0  199  0  5711  2 000  0  007779  04
99/01-90/03  -0296  0 767  0  248  -D0926  086419  1004  0  000649  64  99/1-99/03  0 195  0  740  0/084  0109g  086111  2  700  0 067383  54
99/02-90/04  -0 135  0 944  0  147  - 09236  0957986  1038  009D4426  05  960-9/0D4  0  191  0  961  0 0896  0006  086841  1804  00D03679  659
99/03-98/00  -0 361  0803D  0  133  -O0009  0  7003  2  351  0062914  60  880-80  -0060  0  993  -.  0 127a0  0038  00726  2 196  00075  8
90/04-99/01  -33152  1  015  0  003  -0 125  088086  2138  0  002700  95  88/04-90/00  -0 339  08005  0  092  000  0  .733622  2 122  000328  55
99,0-99/07  3 103  0  994  0  008  003'7  081  1ie  I910  009D2899  89  99/0099/07  0  043  0090  0  026  -0 018  0  7494  2188  D003122  00
99/00-99/00  0  676  0914  D0007  0  103  0  8185  2  351  0  003008  86  99/06-99/00  09507  090D4  -00689  0076  0 8108  1001  0  00285  80
09/07-00/09  1151  0 063  . 0  019  0263  0  7878  20364  0  064064  08  99107-88/06  1803 - 0631  0  100  0  215  06340  2117  0  000828  00
99/08.99/10  0007l  08089  0010  0218  08713  2  203  0  00533  89  88/08-88/10  08009  0  711  016  0160  0  3878  18917  0008388  05
9009-90/1/  00503  1  023  -0011I  0018s  0  6617  2  158  0  008043  65  98/9-899I1  0  308  0  743  0  126  0188  03777  1682  000471  65
90/10-90/12  -031  0.085  . -0  032  -0  141  006738  2  075  D0094024  86  99/10-98/12  -1 470  9  0031  00090  0  064  0.3107  1  914  0  006712  60
N.te  Mo/NOl  aste/SkS (f-),a  sigle  aster,sk (180  adaPOUnd  ()  i/d.c/e8tha  th.8h  8tim18ted  0oe6/6l6n8s  are  Statistically significant  a/ the 1%, 0%,..ad 10% levels, ra.espnt//y
93300000000  00000000  00000000  00000080  3833388  -000  0-000  0-00  0  0-00  0-000  0-00  0  0-00  0-000  0  -0 - 00--00--
0  -9.-.--.-..-.-z  8  ooo
8 0ooooooooooooooo60PP50.oooo
0 oooo~~~~~~~~~~oooooooooo'
O~fOoOOOOOoO-.OO0o000O000~O0O000O0.~.000O000~J0  00  0  0  o  oo  o  oo  o  o  bo  o&0b  b 
S 6  . ..  L  6  6.  . . 66666  666-  . ..  6  6  6.  . 6L.66.6  6666  66-6666p  - --  6  - --  - o 3333333333  833333333333  333  00000003  3333a  2  09  S R  00  0  8  20020000090z; 0  ~~~9333~~~~66633Ž9A3oooo0oooo  -~~~~~~~~~~~  0003000063oo0030000000006  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  AS  SS0
- ---  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  --- 000--  000000--  -00-0  0  --------------------  ------ 0000  000 
. . . . . . . . . . . 9  E  a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
o.  2  2  2  222222222  2  2  ~~~~~~~~~~2  2  2  2  2  2  2  . 6  2  2  2  2  2  8 
'*0  0  0  . . ..  0~~~~~  ..  ..  C
0  0  0  2.0  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 
0  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
- . . . o  o  0  - .0.0.0.0.0.0.  0  .. 0.0.0.  . 0  . .0  . 0  0  . . 0  0  0  0  N  .00.  0 . 0  . . . . . 0.  0N0000N000 
S  IN333  3~  313.3  3  3  3  8  33  3  3  0  0  0  0  0  00  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  0  03  0  0  0  0  0  8  8  0  30  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  0  3 8 8  0000000008  -. 000000000~~~~~  00  0  0  0  3  0  00  0  0  0  8  03  3  3  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  00  0  0  0
00000 0000000000000000000  00000000000000000  00000000000000000  . ..  . ..  . ..  .
IS  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  o0  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  0  00  *  00  0  0Appendix  Table.  (Continued)
(k) Cambodia Riel  (I) Laos  Kip
PeSoS  Cans:  /300  Si  EURO  62-ad:  0.06.  Old-las  No. abs.  Padod  Coast  /300  JO  EURO)  ,02-841  /3.66.  OtS-ras  No.  ass~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Is  . N*  bsaCO  SD  jyEUR  R
90/0  1-90/03  6  400  1473  -0 467  -0 918  -006  1  461  04  90/0-90903  2 573  0  907  0191  -0 068  090470  2  074  0  027622  54
97/02-90041  6 94  1  439  -0 362  -1 023  -0.0370  2  024  0  049017  5  902-/4  010  0 060  0  099  064  03De  39  0028  6
/03-9/5  -0 032  0177  0  093  0  702  0.4319  2  297  0  005925  66  90/00-90/05  -0 083  0 130  0110  0  814  0  4475  2  251  0006299  66
00/'4-000  0 499  0  397  - 0  145  0  354  0  5429  1048  0.054787  45  90/D4-90/06  0  470  0  313  0  145  0  467  05142  994  0.005141  65
90/05-90/07  0903  0  310  5  107  0  458  0  4248  2  101  00D06240  86  90/05-90/07  0  643  0  260  0  125  0  601  04110  2124  0006968  66
90/06-93090  10 569  -1 807  -3 217  4  012  00387  18478  0  091000  90  90606-90608  0  681  0 009  0 159  0  222  000240  20698  0  067107  66
90/07-90/09  13  054  -0/704  -2 172  1 659  00628  1 912  6  094400  89  90107-90109  50876  0  233  0  019  0  313  0 1487  2 464  0  008699  65
s0/0,-90/10  116010  -1 206  -1  887  2  399  6  0044  15913  0.093830  90  90/06-90:10  0  718  9  004  0010s  6822  02593  28678  6009607  96
0/-90/11  056  -0 116  0  067  0  764  0  2620  2  204  006O8606  85  90/09-95/11  0  281  -0 160  -000D6  09649  0.2898  2  289  0006476  65
9/-992  0334  0  084  6  239  04860  0  2547  2  342  0  008388  90  90110-90/12  -0  109  0  059  0  106  0  609  03241  2  483  0  067531  86
30/11-91/01l  -90403  0 300  0  239  -0  294  0  1591  2  284  0  006538  90  90/11-91/01  -0  241  007/I  020980  -9148  618654  20095  0906176  66
90/12-91/02  -0322  0  449  0 189  -0  338  4  0  2184  2  336  0  006948  84  90/12-91/02  -0  282  0  415  0  140  -6 219  0  1781  23270  0 606401  54
31/01-91/03  -0~~~76  0  D493  0  055  -03276  0  2288  2  30  0  009888  84  91101-91/00  -0459  0  466  0  090  -0 2544  0  1826  2  271  0  006481  64
91/02-91/04  -2~~~067-  0  451  -0 247  -19  048  221  0762  63  91/02-91/04  -06-  0  457  -0 282  4  -0  142  0  1485  2  431  0D046920  63
91/03-9/109  -1 303  0  236  -0 148  -0  085  -0.0/06  2  343  0  008803  90  91/03-91/05  -1 297  0  232  -0 149  -90605  -0  0103  29345  0  008706  68
91/04-91/06  3  406  0  528  0005  -0 145  -0 0095  2  018  0  004926  85  91904-91/06  -1  279  0  177  -6 210  0  018  -0 0305  2  203  0  006249  85
91/05-91/07  0  347  -0 142  10965  0.799  00174  1037  00482  66  91/09-91/07  -0 262  -0  236  07898  0  390  -O00006  2  090  0.008194  66
9I/05-1/00  66/9l  0110  / 729  0 062  6  0237  1541  0  0488306  85  91/168-91/08  -0  661  0  194  -0 012  -0 184  -0 0168  1 828  D0069092  65
31/017-91/09  4  761  -0 629  2.4002  -0  216B  00457  1 907  00098608  68  91/07-51/09  0  762  0  096  0  32/  -6 284  0  0489  2  042  60080025  90
D/109-9/I/  0  116  0  300  0.082  -0 218  0 00-42  1065  0  008084  90  91/08-91/10  0  116  0  332  0  092  -0 218  0  0642  10909  06940594  66
91/00-91411  6  010  00561  6123  -0  638  -0 0073  2  090  0  028261  89  91/0-91/11  005,3  0 000  0082  -0 547  0  2038  2  102  0.0O6825  65
91/10-91/12  0  600  6541  09539  -0  671  -0020  2  026  0  043118  66  91/10-91/12  0003  0  290  0011l  -0243  0  0080  2  000  0  007690  48
01/11-92/0/  -0314  0 179  0.482  -6  268  -00378  29042  0  043544  80  61/17-92/0/  0  657  0  217  -0 132  -09063  -0 0216  2  086  6  0088466  96
/9/t2-92/02  -/ 224  -00691  0 515  -0  071  -0 0420  2/01  0  033871  90  91/12-92/02  -00  0  112  -0 233  6  126  -0.0326  2  031  0  010948  66
/2/01-92/03  -2 639  -0 007  -6 055  0200  -094103  2068  0  012905  80  92/01-942/03  -129  0  106  -0160  0021  -09D414  2.0,51  00063  79  65
92/02-92/04  -1 790  06030  0 024  0 157  -00446  1  966  0  012359  64  92/02-92/04  -0  549  0  27/  -0 149  -0184  -6 0273  1 794  00608347  84
92/03-00/03  -0  720  0  249  -0 037  9644  0  0908  2900  0  010943  45  52/03-02/05  0  383  0  396  -0 039  00641  0  2182  2  176  96006217  69
32/04-02/06  3  900  0  705  -1 223  1  6555  0 0490  / 90  0  0005871  69  92/04-92/0  08665  0  438-  0  263  0  264  0  3789  2  301  00G06172  85
/2/05-90/07  4  602  0  60  -1 221  1  260  0  0290  2  058  0  026065  90  92/00-00/07  1  390  0224  0  295  0 222  0  2433  2279  0 007345  90
92/00-920/0  4934  04827  -1 48948  1  290  0  0006  1  068  0020694  88  92/00-92/00  13  32  0  460  0/082  -0 068  0 2309  2  055  0  096813  68
32/0-90/09  9  760  _  -253  0  870  -0 417  -0 0424  2011l  0  077183  46  92/07-9/9  0339  -0 063  0  519  0  447  011478  26535  0  014893  96
92/96-90/10  14  276  0  533  0544  -0845  -0 0233  2  073  00850  65  92/09910  -0  447  0  437  0  096  0  490  0.1890  23412  6  015715  85
02/09-92//i  14  088  0  673  0662  -0823  -0 0292  2  085  0  0858658  96  92/09-17  -1285  0212  0  294  0  416  8  0.1905  2  448  09016716  85
92/10-93//2  6956e  11i13  -0 077  -0 7690  00650  0116  06037428  6  90  2/15-92/32  -09056  666  -018  2  0  087  5  2408  2  051  0 090881  68
929/1-93/01  -0  304  -0  25/  0708  - 0  306  8  01980  18B22  000817  65  02/l1/-93/07  -0 153  -0  264  0716  - 0  304  0  1908  1834  0D068716  65
/7/12-93/02  0  283  0  106  0  281  0  524  0  1972  2  208  0  01088  64  92/12-93/02  012  0 35  0  095  09605  0  2039  2  118  6011729  64
93/01-03/03  14076  -0945  28911  1  998  00040  2  070  0  081114  84  93/01-93/03  -0 211  0289  0  051  0  897  0  2233  1950  0  011722  84
93/02-93/04  /11303  -09051  2  396  2  36  0  0101  201I0  0081213  65  93/102-93/0  -0 498  0  652  0071l  09063  0.2284  1812  06012067  45
93/03-93/05  /09141  -1 036  2562  2  310  090079  2  014  008B0338  80  9303-93/06  0  242  0  400  07176  0  377  01728  190  009891  66
93/04-03/06  A 606  0  210  -0014  0  421  060332  2  129  0  006855  85  90493/96  0  016  02  005  0  178  009  161  0009699  06
9059/7  -0775  0  219  0  0/4  00029  00D657  1990  00690896  65  93/05-53/07  -0  775  0  219  0  014  0  328  0.0606  1985  0968847  85
93/'06-93/1  -0  529  -0  231  -0 115  08620  0  1059  1479  0D069004  90  93/06-62/08  -09841  -0  204  -06086  0  472  0  0537  1414  00090145  466
9307930  16  015  09  0  428  0  0183  6  1 490  0008385  96  03107-3/09  1  139  -0 170  -0  060  0  313  09D400  1 329  0  007801  60
93/0-93/101  03836  -,0029  -010  4g  08628  0176  1477  6006D805  65  03/90-93910  0  300  -0 00/  -0 103  0  490  - 0  0637  1  49  0  008982  55
93/09-03/11  /  _-063  0  272  0  031  0  230  00989  I 000  0  006900  80  53/99-62/11  -04607  0  27/  0  026  0345  0 1029  29074  0 004690  865
93110-939/0  -0 005  0388  0046  0191  0  1798  1934  0  004649  68  9/010-2/1  -0604  0 389  0  067  9 188  01800  79233  0098848  86
939/1-94/0/  0  162  048  65  -05  51828  2138  6  005296  84  93/11-94/1i  6162  0  430  0  103  -0152  5.1830  310  0  002624  50
93112-94/02  06474  9563  011  -249  000272  1996  0  09014'8  64  93/1-94/02  0  474  06563  0/51  -0248  0  2371  1  967  0 D008147  64
94/01-94/03  06457  0631  017868  -0 255  4  0  284  1003  0090291  64  04101-9453  0  458  0  631  - 0178I 8  -525'5 8  92945  10023  09015292  54
94/02-94/04  0  173  0  660  0114  -0133  0  2856  1841  00698896  64  64/02-04/04  0  173  0  660  0  114  -0 134  0  2696  1  941  00559  84
34/03-94405  0116  0  610  -0  053  00186  0  3815  2  033  0904480  90  54/03-54/05  0  1/6  0  671  -0  050  0  010  03819  2  033  0  004475  66
94/04-94/06  0  265  0 749  0  058  -90/00  0  4831  2  180  0  004548  85  94/694906  0205  9740  0058  -0 010  04838  2 161  009'4541  63
94/09-94/07  6 157  0  577  007  4  -0  046  0  4301  2  296  0  005564  65  94/05-94/07  5 /157  0677  0  074  -0090  0  4205  2  267  0  005558  65
94/06-94/00  0  469  0697  09015  -0 121  0  4174  2  395  0000663  68  94/06-04/08  0460  0007  . 0  019  -0 121  0  4174  2  399  0 00666a  60
94/7-94/00  - 35/  1  390  -0668  -77a018  1  2  083  68  94/07-54/09  0198  0579  0032  -07  29  02  0 665508  96
94/00-949/0  -4 347  1  405  -0  727  -0 480  -081l71  2018  0039618  96  940-/10  670  73  0440  . 0  071  -0 107  01703  2  424  0.00602  66
94/69-94/11  -4917  1  580  -13264  -0  132  -00194  2028  0038319  85  94/09-411  0  003  0330  0304  -0  034  5  1868  2  383  0.096292  65
94/10-94/12  -0/126  0  458  0  196  -0  197  0/1370  2  303  0  095968  85  94/10-94/12  -0149  05474  0  202  -0 206  16124  2 335  00030  65
941/195/0/  0023  0  54  0  344  8  0205  0  3012  2  373  0.065263  08  04/11-9510/  -00D21  0502  0  340  -0  231  0  2798  2  335  000D5758  90
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